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Introduction
There is a vigorous debate on the environmental impact of China’s
investment in Africa.  Most of it occurs in the environmental advocacy
community, which by its nature emphasizes the challenges, problems, and
harmful impacts on the environment irrespective of the responsible coun-
try.  China’s environmental record both at home and in Africa has been the
subject of criticism— much of it deserved.1  Critical commentary from the
environmental community and journalists occasionally results in rejoin-
ders from Chinese officials, who tend to minimize the problem.
In all fairness, if a Chinese investment has no notable negative envi-
ronmental impact, it rarely receives attention, and good practices are usu-
ally ignored by environmental groups and the media.  For example, a
recent dialogue on environmental and social sustainability involving Chi-
† Adjunct Professor, George Washington University’s Elliott School of
International Affairs.
1. See, e.g., Yi Yimin, Improving China’s Aid and Investment to Africa with a More
Open Attitude, in 1 CHINESE RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENVIRONMENT 381, 384 (Yang
Dongping ed., 2013).
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nese environmental officials and the leadership of the African Develop-
ment Bank concluded that “little publicity is given to the good practices
among Chinese firms while the negative practices received wider media
attention.”2  This analysis, which draws heavily on previous studies and
research, has the same limitations but includes a perspective from China.
China’s rapid economic development over the last three decades has
led to significant environmental pollution and some poor policy choices.
With more than 1.3 billion people, China has the world’s largest popula-
tion and has been the biggest energy consumer since 2010.3  As the world’s
largest producer and consumer of coal, China is also the highest emitter of
carbon dioxide that contributes to global warming.4  The 2014 Report on
the State of the Environment in China said that less than ten percent of 161
cities included in the national air quality monitoring system met national
standards.5
With only seven percent of global water resources and increasing pol-
lution problems, water scarcity is probably China’s most important con-
straint for development.6  Less than half of China’s water can be treated
and made safe for drinking, and another quarter of surface water is so
polluted that it is unfit for industrial use.7  In 2014, more than sixty per-
cent of major cities had groundwater categorized as bad to very bad, and
more than a quarter of China’s key rivers were deemed unfit for human
contact.8  Lack of waste removal and proper processing, combined with
negligent farming practices, overgrazing, and the effects of climate change
have turned much of China’s arable land into desert.9
China does understand, however belatedly, the seriousness of these
challenges and is taking steps to address them.10  Harrie Esterhuyse,
research analyst at the Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch Univer-
sity in South Africa, warns that “the mitigation costs of pollution in China
have risen to such high levels that [they] have begun to threaten broad-
2. China welcomes AfDB’s leadership in ensuring the sustainability of projects in
Africa, AFR. DEV. BANK GROUP (Dec. 31, 2013), www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/arti-
cle/china-welcomes-afdbs-leadership-in-ensuring-the-sustainability-of-projects-in-africa-
12734/.
3. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., CHINA: INTERNATIONAL ENERGY DATA AND ANALYSIS
(2015), http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/
China/china.pdf.
4. See id.
5. Han Yong, Environmental Index: Measuring Up, NEWS CHINA (Oct. 2015), http://
www.newschinamag.com/magazine/measuring-up.
6. Scott Moore, The Politics of Thirst: Managing Water Resources under Scarcity in the
Yellow River Basin, People’s Republic of China 1 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Energy Tech.
Innovation Pol’y Res. Group, Discussion Paper No. 2013-08, 2014).
7. N.D., Water Pollution: A Bay of Pigs Moment, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 12, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/03/water-pollution.
8. Eleanor Albert & Beina Xu, China’s Environmental Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. BACKGROUNDERS (Jan. 18, 2016), http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-environmental-
crisis/p12608.
9. Id.
10. Christine Loh, Contrasting Realities: China’s Environmental Challenge, HUM. RTS.
IN CHINA (July 18, 2011), www.hrichina.org/en/crf/article/5423.
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based economic growth, indirectly feeding into structural inequality, which
is a cause of political disaffection.”11
A huge continental landmass with numerous island nations, Africa
has many climate and ecological zones.  As such, it is difficult to generalize
about its environment.  Of all the continents, Africa is the poorest.12  It
now has 1.1 billion people, and sub-Saharan Africa has the world’s most
rapidly growing population.13  Africa is believed to be the continent both
most vulnerable to global climate change, and the least able to adapt to it.14
Key environmental problems today in parts of the continent include defor-
estation, desertification, reduced soil productivity, pollution, and the
depletion of fresh water sources.15  Africa has a recent history of periodic
droughts, floods, and serious outbreaks of a wide variety of diseases.16
While most African countries are paying more attention to environmental
issues, the topic remains a relatively low policy priority.
I. Categorizing and Defining Foreign Direct Investment
The literature often fails to separate Chinese foreign direct investment
(FDI) in Africa from its aid projects, commercial deals, and implementa-
tion of contracts for African governments and other organizations.  All of
these activities tend to be intermingled, especially in journalistic accounts.
A majority of the major infrastructure projects that Chinese state-owned
companies have constructed in Africa are commercial deals or come from
the winning of contracts.17  But it is not always so simple.  For example,
PowerChina, a state-owned company, has created separate units: Sinohydro
International Corporation Limited and Sinohydro Resources Limited.18
The former has responsibility for equipment, procurement, and construc-
tion contracts, while the latter normally does Build, Own, and Transfer
(BOT) model projects.19  Sinohydro International Corporation Limited
projects do not qualify as FDI— the Soubre´ hydropower dam in Coˆte
d’Ivoire is a case in point.  Sinohydro Resources Limited projects might
qualify as FDI.  For example, the company is building a cement plant in
Mozambique where it will hold fifty-five percent of its shares; this would
11. Harrie Esterhuyse, Pollution and Social Stability in China: Dispelling the Obvious,
CTR. FOR CHINESE STUD. COMMENT. (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/
uploads/2014/12/CCS_Commentary_Pollution_HE_2014.pdf.
12. Sarah Kiggundu, Addressing Emerging Environmental Issues in 21st Century
Africa, CONSULTANCY AFR. INTELLIGENCE (May 9, 2013), http://www.polity.org.za/article/
addressing-emerging-environmental-issues-in-21st-century-africa-2013-05-09.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. David Shinn, China in Africa: Environmental Implications and the Law, INT’L POL’Y
DIG. (Oct. 25, 2015) [hereinafter Shinn, China in Africa], http://www.internationalpoli-
cydigest.org/2015/10/25/china-in-africa-environmental-implications-and-the-law/.
18. See Activist Guides to Sinohydro’s Environment and Social Policies, INT’L RIVERS
(Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/8463.
19. See id.
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seem to constitute FDI.20  On the other hand, the company is constructing
a turnkey copper and cobalt mining project in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo that does not seem to qualify as FDI.21  African governments,
Chinese companies, and institutions such as the Export-Import Bank of
China contribute a majority of funding for these contracts and
investments.22
There are also problems of definition.  It can be difficult to determine
what specific Chinese activities in Africa or other countries constitute FDI
under commonly-used definitions.  China has an official definition of
inward FDI, which differs from the one the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) uses.23  China’s definition refers to
investment in China by foreign enterprises, economic organizations, or
individuals to open solely foreign-funded enterprises.24  It also includes
the running of Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures and participation in
cooperative joint ventures, or co-development of resources with any enter-
prises or economic organizations within China in the form of spot
exchange, real object, or technology.25
The OECD countries have a precise, short definition of FDI and many
pages of more detailed guidelines.26  According to the OECD, FDI has the
goal of establishing a lasting interest by a resident enterprise in one econ-
omy (direct investor), in an enterprise that is resident in an economy other
than that of the direct investor (direct investment).27  This implies a long-
term relationship between the direct investor and the direct investment
enterprise, and a significant degree of influence on the management of the
enterprise.28  Direct or indirect ownership of ten percent or more of the
voting power of an enterprise resident in one economy by an investor resi-
dent in another economy constitutes such a relationship.29
China does not seem to have an official definition for outward FDI
and, in the case of China’s investments in Africa, it is rarely possible to
document whether they meet the OECD definition.30  Consequently, when
a Chinese company, either state-owned or private, declares that the project
is an investment, it is exceedingly difficult to prove otherwise.  This analy-
sis assumes that declared investments qualify, but makes every effort to
20. See Press Release, Business Segment: Building Materials Sector, PowerChina
Resources Ltd., http://pr.powerchina.cn/tabid/397/language/zh-CN/Default.aspx.
21. See Press Release, Business Segment: Mineral Resources Sector, PowerChina
Resources Ltd., http://pr.powerchina.cn/tabid/395/language/zh-CN/Default.aspx.
22. Shinn, China in Africa, supra note 17.
23. Id.
24. Pan Jihua & John M. Forgach, Going Global, Going Green: CCICED on Investment,
Trade, and Environment, CHINA COUNCIL FOR INT’L COOPERATION ON ENV’T AND DEV. 17
(2012), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/going_global_going_green.pdf.
25. Id.
26. See generally OECD BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,
OECD (4th ed. 2008).
27. Id. at 48.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 48– 49.
30. Shinn, China in Africa, supra note 17.
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remove from the discussion Chinese aid projects, commercial deals, and
implementation of contracts for African governments and the private sec-
tor.  While these other Chinese activities can have a significant impact on
Africa’s environment, perhaps an even greater impact than FDI from
China, they do not fall within the scope of the analysis.
II. Relative Concern About the Environment in Africa and China
It is useful to put the relative importance of environmental concerns in
both Africa and China into perspective.  Protection of the environment has
never been a particularly high priority for African governments.  African
leaders have traditionally been much more concerned about issues such as
disease, poverty, civil conflict, ethnic violence, and religious extremism.31
While this remains the case, there is a growing awareness of the impor-
tance of good environmental practices and a concern that global warming
will have especially negative implications for the continent.
A study by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project sur-
veyed people in forty-four countries regarding five of the greatest dangers
in the world: religious and ethnic hatred, inequality, AIDS and other dis-
eases, nuclear weapons, and pollution and the environment.32  The survey
included nine African countries: Tunisia, Nigeria, Egypt, Senegal,
Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana, South Africa, and Uganda.  All but one African
country ranked pollution and the environment as the least important of the
five concerns.33  Eight percent of Ugandan respondents answered that pol-
lution and the environment was the greatest threat, leading it to be ranked
in fourth place of the dangers, just ahead of religious and ethnic hatred,
which was ranked in fifth place by seven percent of survey takers.34  One
survey of nine African countries does not document definitively the rela-
tive concern that government officials and ordinary people have about
environmental issues.  Based on the author’s extensive experience in
Africa, however, it tends to track with impressions acquired over the years.
In comparison, the situation for China is different.  China was also
one of the forty-four countries in the Pew study.  Of the five dangers sur-
veyed, pollution and the environment were ranked the highest, attracting
the support of thirty-three percent of the respondents.35  A separate Pew
survey found that the Chinese public is increasingly concerned about the
country’s air and water quality.36  In 2012, thirty-six percent of respon-
dents agreed that air pollution was a very big problem.37  In 2013, the per-
31. See infra notes 32– 34 and accompanying text.
32. See Greatest Dangers in the World, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www
.pewglobal.org/2014/10/16/greatest-dangers-in-the-world/.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See Environmental Concerns on the Rise in China, PEW RES. CTR. (Sep. 19, 2013),
http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/09/19/environmental-concerns-on-the-rise-in-china/.
37. Id.
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centage increased to forty-seven percent.38  In 2012, thirty-three percent
thought that water pollution was a big problem.39  The number then grew
to forty percent in 2013.40  This is significant because concerns in China
about domestic challenges, such as those related to the environment, often
manifest themselves later as policy priorities pursued by China outside its
borders.  The situation has reached a point where the environmental record
of government officials has become an important part of their evaluation
by the Communist Party; cadres are held accountable for their actions even
after leaving their positions.41
III. Increasing Attention on the Environment by Chinese Companies
Investing Overseas
The Export-Import Bank of China, the main financing institution for
Chinese companies investing abroad, is one of the leaders in urging better
environmental policies.  In 2004, it developed its own environmental pol-
icy and impact assessments whereby it encouraged Chinese companies
venturing overseas to comply with host country policies regarding sustain-
able development and environmental protection.42
Environmental concerns were not a significant part of the discussion
in the early years of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).43
China seemed to take a disengaged approach to the environmental prac-
tices of Chinese companies operating overseas.  At the 2006 FOCAC in
Beijing, Chinese and African leaders agreed to “intensify cooperation in
environment protection, share experiences and boost sustainable develop-
ment on both sides.”44  In 2006, an OECD working party on environmen-
tal performance met in Beijing where it agreed, together with the Chinese
delegation, to a series of recommendations concerning environmental
practices.45  The recommendations included the need for improvement of
Chinese “governmental oversight and environmental performance in the
overseas operations of Chinese corporations.”46
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Raise the green lanterns, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 5, 2015), http://www.economist
.com/node/21679500/.
42. Daouda Cisse´ et al., State-Directed Multi-National Enterprises and Transnational
Governance: Chinese Investments in Africa, Corporate Responsibility and Sustainability
Norms (Stellenbosch University Ctr. for Chinese Stud., Discussion Paper, Jan. 2014),
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/95493.
43. LUCY CORKIN, CHINA, AFRICA, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 6 (2009).
44. Zhou Yan & Ou Sa, Chinese, African Leaders Underscore Cooperation in Environ-
ment Protection, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 5, 2006), http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english/2006-11/05/content_5292754.htm?rss=1.  See May Tan-Mullins, Policy Meets
Practice: Chinese Environmental Protection in Africa in the Wake of FOCAC VI, in FOCAC
VI: AFRICAN INITIATIVES TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE CHINESE RELATIONSHIP 50, 52 (Ross
Anthony ed., 2015).
45. OECD, ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEWS: CHINA 14 (2007).
46. Id. at 30.
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At the 2009 FOCAC meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh, Chinese and African
officials devoted more attention to environmental issues, especially climate
change.  They agreed to use FDI to bolster economic growth and sustaina-
ble development, but did not address the environmental practices of Chi-
nese companies in Africa.47  In 2010, eight Chinese academics, planners,
and economists, along with the support of the Global Environmental Insti-
tute (a Chinese non-governmental organization) published a book titled
Environmental Polices on China’s Investment Overseas.48  The authors con-
cluded that environmental protection policies were badly lacking with
respect to China’s FDI and foreign aid.49  They urgently called for China to
issue guidelines regarding FDI, aid, and loans in other countries.50
There is growing evidence that China is now encouraging its compa-
nies to follow better environmental practices as they invest in Africa and
other countries.  Chinese companies are increasingly using environmental
impact assessments, and sometimes even drawing on the expertise of West-
ern companies that specialize in these studies.51  This development is not
surprising in light of the growing concern about environmental problems
in China and a deeper understanding by the government that it is not in
China’s interest to export its bad practices overseas.52  In 2013, China’s
Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Environmental Protection issued
voluntary guidelines that encouraged companies investing overseas to fol-
low local environmental laws, assess the environmental risks of their
projects, minimize the impact on local heritage, manage waste, comply
with international standards, and draft plans for handling emergencies.53
Bie Tao, an official in China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection, com-
mented that “no side will win if the environment is neglected, and we have
many lessons in this regard.”54
International environmental advocacy groups have been cautiously
optimistic about the issuance of the guidelines.  Grace Mang, Co-Program
47. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010– 2012), F.
ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/
dsjbzjhy/hywj/t626387.htm.  See Tan-Mullins, supra note 44, at 52– 53.
48. Meng Si, Environmental Policies on China’s Investment Overseas, CHINADIALOGUE
(Oct. 9, 2010), https://www.chinadialogue.net/books/3811— Environmental-Policies-
on-China-s-Investment-Overseas-/en.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Becky Davis, Chinese Mining Group Sets Guidelines for Overseas Interaction, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/25/business/international/
chinese-mining-group-sets-guidelines-for-overseas-interaction.html?_r=1.
52. Notification of the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Environmental
Protection on Issuing the Guidelines for Environmental Protection in Foreign Investment
and Cooperation (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of
China and the Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China,
Mar. 1, 2013, effective Feb. 18, 2013), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/poli-
cyrelease/bbb/201303/20130300043226.shtml.
53. Id.
54. China Asks Companies to Mind Environment When Investing Overseas, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-02-28/china-
asks-companies-to-mind-environment-when-investing-overseas.
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Director at International Rivers, concluded that “the Chinese government
has sent a strong signal to its companies that it expects them to act respon-
sibly and lawfully when operating overseas.”55  Tao Hu, a senior associate
at the World Resources Institute and previously an economist at a research
center associated with China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection, com-
mented that the guidelines provide basic principles for Chinese companies
to integrate environmental protection into their corporate strategies, but
emphasized that the guidelines have no teeth.  If companies choose to
ignore the guidelines, there is no penalty.56  Therefore, he suggested China
might eventually have to implement mandatory guidelines.57
In 2014, the government-affiliated China Chamber of Commerce for
Minerals, Metals, and Chemicals Importers and Exporters announced
guidelines to regulate overseas mining investments and operations.  The
guidelines were developed in collaboration with the OECD, the German
development agency GIZ, and Global Witness, an advocacy group that
focuses on natural resource management.  These guidelines encourage Chi-
nese companies that invest overseas to pay careful attention to labor issues,
environmental protection, supply chain due diligence, and human rights
concerns.  While it is too soon to judge the impact of these guidelines,
initial reactions have been positive.58
Chinese state-owned and privately owned companies are also demon-
strating greater interest in protecting the environment.  One such example
is the United Nations Global Compact, a “voluntary corporate responsibil-
ity initiative that commits businesses to align their operations and strate-
gies with ten universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights,
labor, environment, and anti-corruption.”59  Its seventh Principle empha-
sizes that businesses should “support a precautionary approach to environ-
mental challenges.”60  This involves risk assessment, risk management,
and risk communication.61  According to Principle Eight, signatories
should seek greater environmental responsibility through self-regulation
and dialogue with employees and the public while adopting appropriate
codes of conduct.62  Principle Nine encourages businesses to develop and
diffuse environmentally friendly technologies that use materials with effi-
ciency and cleanliness.63
55. Grace Mang, Beijing Sends a Signal to Chinese Overseas Dam Builders, INT’L RIVERS
(Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.internationalrivers.org/blogs/262/beijing-sends-a-signal-
to-chinese-overseas-dam-builders.
56. Tao Hu, A Look at China’s New Environmental Guidelines on Overseas Investments,
WORLD RESOURCES INST. (July 3, 2013), http://www.wri.org/blog/2013/07/look-chinas-
new-environmental-guidelines-overseas-investments.
57. Id.
58. Davis, supra note 51.
59. Shinn, China in Africa, supra note 17.
60. Id.
61. The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, https://
www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles/principle-7 (last visited Nov.
8, 2015).
62. Shinn, China in Africa, supra note 17.
63. Id.
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The Global Compact counts over 13,000 corporations and other stake-
holders from about 170 countries as signatories.64  By 2015, 272 Chinese
businesses— private as well as state-owned, non-governmental organiza-
tions, and business associations— had signed up.65  The first Chinese com-
pany to sign the Compact did so in 2000.66  The Compact includes mostly
small, medium, and large private companies, with the exception of a num-
ber of large state-owned companies with operations in Africa.67  These
member companies only represent a modest chunk of the several thousand
Chinese companies operating in Africa.68  Also, it is one thing to sign the
Compact and another to implement its guidelines.  In fact, little is required
of signatories.  Chinese companies, not unlike companies from other coun-
tries, have had a mixed response to the Compact.  Members commit to
make the Compact principles part of their business strategies in day-to-day
operations and to submit an annual progress report.69  For example,
Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. and PetroChina Co. Ltd., both of which are
heavily invested in Africa, have a good track record for submitting their
annual reports.70  There is, however, a considerable variation in the degree
of seriousness among Chinese companies in complying with the
Compact.71
In 2012, a company engaged in Africa, the China Petroleum and
Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC), announced that it was issuing the first
white paper on environmental protection by a Chinese enterprise.72  In the
paper, SINOPEC said it was committed to providing sufficient funds for
environmental protection and would adhere to clean production by raising
resource efficiency and developing green energy, and to improving the
emergency response systems to mitigate environmental risk.73  In addition,
SINOPEC said it was committed to the Global Compact.74
Daniel Compagnon and Audrey Alejandro, both at Sciences Po Bor-
deaux, point out an important distinction in the kinds of Chinese FDI
going to Africa and elsewhere.  State-owned companies with close ties to
the Communist Party of China account for sixty-nine percent of the FDI in
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Paul Nash, Global Compact Challenges Firms, BUS. WEEKLY (Apr. 8, 2003), http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-04/08/content_162162.htm.
67. Shinn, China in Africa, supra note 17.
68. Id.
69. Id.  See THE GLOBAL COMPACT, AFTER THE SIGNATURE: A GUIDE TO ENGAGEMENT IN
THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT (Mar. 2007).
70. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/participation/report/
cop/create-and-submit/active/22464 (last visited Nov. 8, 2015).
71. Shinn, China in Africa, supra note 17.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.; SINOPEC Releases Its White Paper on Environmental Protection for the First
Time, the First of Its Kind in China, CHINA COUNCIL FOR INT’L COOPERATION ON ENV’T AND
DEV. (Dec. 04, 2012), www.cciced.net/enccied/newscenter/latestnews/201212/
t20121204_243139.html.
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Africa.75  The remaining sources of FDI come from private Chinese invest-
ment banks with government connections: sovereign funds like the China-
Africa Development Fund, Chinese provincial and local governments, and
small private companies and individual businesses.76  Compagnon and
Alejandro concluded that companies most resistant to improved environ-
mental practices in Africa are the small private companies and the
medium-sized ones affiliated with Chinese provincial and municipal
administrations.77  Other experts and organizations that follow this issue
have reached similar conclusions.78
China’s largest companies are generally in the hands of the central
government.79  Combined with the state-owned banks, state-owned enter-
prises generate more than half of the revenue of China’s five hundred larg-
est companies.80  Out of policy concerns, the government controls a
majority of shares of firms in the defense, energy, and telecommunications
industries.  Companies owned by Chinese provinces control about another
quarter of the total revenue.81  These companies compete against each
other as well as with private firms in highly fragmented industries.82
These distinctions are important for a Western audience where the over-
whelming majority of companies investing in Africa come from the private
sector.
IV. Chinese Environmental Practice and Law
A basic understanding of China’s environmental practice and law is
necessary, because Beijing’s domestic policies eventually tend to be
reflected in its approach elsewhere, including Africa.  Compagnon and Ale-
jandro conclude that “Chinese companies reproduced in Africa [environ-
mental] practices and attitudes they had routinely adopted at home.”83
They add that the strength of the environmental policy shift in China and
the tendency of Chinese state-owned companies to project these policies
75. Daniel Compagnon & Audrey Alejandro, China’s External Environmental Policy:
Understanding China’s Environmental Impact in Africa and How it is Addressed, 15 ENVTL.
PRAC. 220, 220– 21 (2013).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. JOHANNA JANSSON, CHRISTOPHER BURKE & WENRAN JIANG, CHINESE COMPANIES IN
THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES OF GABON & THE DRC: PERCEPTIONS OF TRANSPARENCY 46
(2009); Jihua & Forgach, supra note 24, at 32; Meng Si, Following the Money, CHINADIA-
LOGUE (Sept. 20, 2010), https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/3825-
Following-the-money.
79. Shinn, China in Africa, supra note 17.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Paul Hubbard & Patrick Williams, Chinese SOEs: Some are More Equal than
Others, E. ASIA F. (Aug. 24, 2014), www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/08/24/chinese-soes-
some-are-more-equal-than-others/.
83. For an analysis of China’s environmental policy until 2008, see Peter Bosshard,
China’s Environmental Footprint in Africa, S. AFR. INST. INT’L AFF. POL’Y BRIEFING, NO. 3
(Apr. 2008).
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overseas is the greatest hope for change.84  Yi Yimin, a project officer at
Moving Mountains (an international development charity based in North-
ern Ireland), says that to understand the environmental and social impacts
of China’s investments in Africa, one needs to understand the impacts of
Chinese investment in China.85
Benjamin Shobert, founder of a private strategy group and senior asso-
ciate at the National Bureau of Asian Research, recently concluded that
“China’s environmental concerns have reached a critical inflection point,
and these issues are increasingly driving national policy in ways that have
key implications for public health, energy outlooks, and efforts to address
global climate change.”86  He emphasized that these environmental
problems contribute to a fundamental vulnerability that China is facing
today: an inadequate healthcare system.87
There has been a recent shift in China’s focus on environmental chal-
lenges and the need to confront them.  In 2008, China promoted the State
Environmental Protection Administration to the Ministry of Environmental
Protection and placed it under the control of the State Council, which is
the approximate equivalent to the American cabinet.88  In 2012, the Eight-
eenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China adopted “eco-
logical civilization” as one of the five driving pillars of policy.89  At the end
of 2012, the National People’s Congress enacted ten environmental laws
and thirty resource protection laws.90  Local people’s congresses and gov-
ernments adopted more than 700 local environmental rules and regula-
tions, and the departments of the State Council issued hundreds of
environmental regulations.91  China’s first environmental non-governmen-
tal organization appeared in 1994.92  By the end of 2012, almost 8,000
environmental non-governmental organizations had registered with the
Ministry of Civil Affairs.93
The China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and
Development (CCICED) is a high-level advisory body authorized by the
84. MARCUS POWER ET AL., CHINA’S RESOURCE DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA: POWERING DEVEL-
OPMENT? 195– 200 (2012); Weiyong Yang et al., The Emergence of Environmental Regula-
tion in China: Its Limits and Implications for the Petroleum Sector, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL
CHALLENGES FACING A CHINESE OIL COMPANY IN CHAD 29, 29-65 (Geert van Vliet &
Ge´raud Magrin eds., 2012).
85. Yimin, supra note 1, at 384.
86. Benjamin A. Shobert, The Key Drivers of China’s Environmental Policies, in
CHINA’S ENERGY CROSSROADS: FORGING A NEW ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL BALANCE 47,
49 (2014).
87. Id.
88. CHINA COUNCIL FOR INT’L COOPERATION ON ENV’T & DEV., POLICY RESEARCH
REPORT ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY FOR GREEN DEVEL-
OPMENT 2013 44 (2014).
89. Id. at 13.
90. Id. at 44.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 42.
93. Id.
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Chinese government.94  Its governing body includes several non-Chinese
officers, and it receives some outside funding.95  CCICED concludes that
transformative change concerning environmental protection is underway
in China, although desired results will not be achieved until there are addi-
tional tools, capacity, and financing.96  So far, the emphasis has been on
controlling basic air, water, and soil pollution.97  While progress is being
made on some problems, new ones emerge such as wider groundwater pol-
lution, and the changing sources and complexities of air pollution.98
China’s recent efforts to achieve “sustainable consumption” also have
important implications for its trade and FDI, which will require more atten-
tion to the product life cycle, and participation in international certifica-
tion and green standard programs.99
In 1989, the Eleventh Session of the Standing Committee of the Sev-
enth National People’s Congress adopted the comprehensive Environmen-
tal Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China.100  Article 1 states
that the law is intended to protect and improve the environment by
“preventing and controlling pollution and other public hazards, safeguard-
ing human health, and facilitating the development of socialist moderniza-
tion.”101  Article 2 defines environment broadly as “the total body of all
natural elements and artificially transformed natural elements affecting
human existence and development, which includes the atmosphere, water,
seas, land, minerals, forests, grasslands, wildlife, natural and human
remains, nature reserves, historic sites and scenic spots, and urban and
rural areas.”102
Article 6 says that “all units and individuals shall have the obligation
to protect the environment and shall have the right to report on or file
charges against units or individuals that cause pollution or damage the
environment.”103  While Article 9 gives the State Council responsibility for
establishing national standards for environmental quality, Article 16
assigns the responsibility to the local people’s governments to take mea-
sures to improve the quality of the environment for areas under their juris-
dictions.104  According to Article 35, violators of the law shall “be warned
or fined by the competent department of environmental protection admin-
istration or another department invested by law with power to conduct
environmental supervision and management for” a specified list of
94. CHINA COUNCIL FOR INT’L COOPERATION ON ENV’T & DEV., CCICED ANNUAL POL-
ICY REPORT 2011: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MODE: GREEN TRANSFORMATION i (2012).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 17.
97. Id. at 19.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. [Excerpts from] Environmental Laws and Policy Documents, 43 CHINESE L. &
GOV’T 18, 20 (2010) [hereinafter Environmental Laws].
101. Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (1989), 37 CHINESE
L. & GOV’T 18, 58 (2004).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 59– 60.
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infractions.105
As China’s environmental challenges have become more serious, there
has been growing interest in the use of the court system to deal with pol-
luters.  Traditional environmental litigation includes tort cases that seek
compensation for harm caused by environmental pollution and “adminis-
trative failure to act” cases brought by local citizens against polluters, prop-
erty developers, and others.106  The rights of individuals and other bodies
to take environmental complaints to courts are contained in Article 6 of the
Environmental Protection Law cited above and Article 124 of the General
Principles of Civil Law, which states that “any person who pollutes the
environment and causes damage to others in violation of state provisions
for environmental protection and the prevention of pollution shall bear
civil liability in accordance with the law.”107  The primary criminal law
provision in the event of “major environmental pollution accidents” has
historically been Article 338 of the Chinese Criminal Law, which allows for
a maximum criminal sentence of seven years.108  In egregious cases involv-
ing fires, explosions, and the breaching of dikes, Article 115 allows for life
imprisonment or even the death sentence.109
Since 2005, there has been increasing support to establish an environ-
mental public interest litigation system, which allows any citizen, social
organization, and state organ to bring a lawsuit in a state judicial organ for
the sake of the public interest.110  A related recent development, especially
since 2007, has been the rapid growth of environmental courts in China
following a pollution crisis in parts of the country.111  More than 130 envi-
ronmental courts developed between 2007 and 2013.112  They include
environmental divisions within the Intermediate People’s Court, and envi-
ronmental divisions or separate tribunals at the basic court level.113  They
also include environmental panels and environmental xunhui courts,
which usually allow judges to work onsite at agency offices.114  China’s
environmental public interest litigation and the creation of environmental
courts have been significant legal and judicial developments.115
While the environmental courts are intriguing innovations, one study
of them suggests that economic growth in China tends to trump environ-
mental concerns.116  Part of the appeal of the courts is their flexibility in
105. Id. at 63.  For additional information on China’s environmental laws and policy
documents, see Environmental Laws, supra note 100, at 18-25.
106. Alex L. Wang, Environmental Courts and Public Interest Litigation in China, 43
CHINESE L. & GOV’T 4, 4– 5 (2010).
107. Id. at 5.
108. Id. at 6.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 6– 7.
111. Id. at 9.
112. Rachel E. Stern, The Political Logic of China’s New Environmental Courts, 72
CHINA J. 53, 53 (2014).
113. Id. at 54– 55.
114. Wang, supra note 106, at 9.
115. Id. at 15.
116. See Stern, supra note 112, at 61.
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the hands of local officials.  They demonstrate responsiveness to environ-
mental concerns while sometimes aiding or at least not obstructing eco-
nomic developments and social stability.117  Rachel Stern, assistant
professor of law and political science at the University of California, Berke-
ley, concludes that “China’s environmental courts are not a step toward
judicial empowerment, as they might appear at first glance, but an effort to
shore up state capacity through an institution designed to coordinate and
act as a backstop for government agencies.”118  The courts constitute part
of a broader effort to encourage environmental protection as a policy prior-
ity,119  as judges do not necessarily see neutrality as part of their job.120
Additionally, the courts fit into a tradition of socialist courts as conscious-
ness-raising institutions and serve to support social control.121
In 2015, China began to implement its updated 1989 Environmental
Protection Law (EPL), which suggests that China has become more serious
about improving environmental quality.122  The most significant additions
and provisions to the EPL include: (1) increasing the seriousness of the
consequences for violating China’s environmental laws, (2) expanding the
scope of projects subjected to environmental impact assessments, and (3)
allowing nongovernmental organizations to take legal action against pol-
luters in the public interest.123  Article 58 allows non-governmental organi-
zations to file claims in the People’s Court if they (1) are registered with the
civil affairs department at or above the municipal level and (2) have been
focused on environment-related public interest activities for five consecu-
tive years or more.124  Only about three hundred non-governmental organi-
zations meet both of these requirements.125  Chinese environmental non-
governmental organizations are relatively new, lacking in resources, and
struggling to cope with numerous environmental issues.126  Few of them
are paying any attention to overseas investments by Chinese companies.127
Environmental non-governmental groups face major challenges in
China.  Chai Jing, a former anchor for state-run China Central Television,
produced with official support a powerful documentary on air pollution in
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 61– 62.
121. See id. at 62; Qie Jianrong, The Struggling Environmental Courts and Environmen-
tal Public-Interest Litigation, in 1 CHINESE RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENVIRONMENT
325, 325– 34 (Yang Dongping ed., 2013).
122. See Robert L. Falk & Jasmine Wee, China: China’s New Environmental Protection
Law— Implications for Overseas Investors, Joint Ventures and Trading Partners, MONDAQ
(2014), www.mondaq.com/x/345932/Environmental+Law/Chinas+New+Environmen
tal+Protection+Law&login=true.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. See Michael M. Gunter & Ariane C. Rosen, Two-Level Games of International Envi-
ronmental NGOs in China, 3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 270, 273– 80 (2012).
127. See Lo Sze Ping & Yi Yimin, Transgressing Global and Local: Environmental NGOs
and China’s Overseas Investment, in 1 CHINESE RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENVIRON-
MENT 369, 378– 79 (Yang Dongping ed., 2013).
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China called Under the Dome.128  Released on February 28, 2015 and pro-
moted by the People’s Daily online website, it immediately attracted tens of
millions of viewers.129  It described a Ministry of Environmental Protection
that was unable to do anything about a steel industry that ignored environ-
mental rules and is helpless against state-run oil companies.130  China’s
censors ordered the documentary, which had been praised by the new min-
ister of environmental protection, removed from the internet on March 6,
2015.131  While Premier Li Keqiang and the Minister of Environmental
Protection acknowledged the governmental failings and promised to
enforce China’s environmental laws, the banning of the documentary
revealed divisions in the government on the handling of air pollution, and
marked a setback for civil society groups seeking to improve the
situation.132
One study concluded that China’s environmental legislation is strong
on paper, but its implementation tends to be weak.133  Much depends on
the efforts of local governments, which have considerable autonomy, and
other state agencies.  Policies implemented at the provincial and municipal
level are often characterized by apathy and lack of oversight.134  CCICED
argues that large state-owned companies such as China National Petroleum
Corporation, SINOPEC, and China National Offshore Oil Corporation
“have adopted a series of rigorous environmental protection standards.”135
At the same time, CCICED acknowledges that “Chinese enterprises still
appear to be 15– 20 years behind” their Western counterparts when it
comes to the adoption of modern social and environmental approaches to
their outward FDI.136  Two Chinese environmental specialists concluded
that China has made steady progress on environmental legislation but still
has an unsatisfactory enforcement system.137  In particular, they argue that
there are inadequate sanctions for those who damage the environment and
128. See Edward Wong, China Blocks Web Access to ‘Under the Dome’ Documentary on
Pollution, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/07/world/asia/
china-blocks-web-access-to-documentary-on-nations-air-pollution.html?_r=0.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See Christina Larson, China Hails, Then Bans a Documentary, BLOOMBERG BUSI-
NESSWEEK (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-12/
china-hails-then-bans-antipollution-film-under-the-dome; Edward Wong & Chris Buck-
ley, Chinese Premier Vows Tougher Regulation on Air Pollution, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/16/world/asia/chinese-premier-li-keqiang-vows-
tougher-regulation-on-air-pollution.html?_r=0.
133. See David H. Shinn, The Environmental Impact of China’s Investment in Africa,
INT’L POL’Y DIG. (Apr. 8, 2015) [hereinafter Shinn, Environmental Impact], http://www
.internationalpolicydigest.org/2015/04/08/the-environmental-impact-of-china-s-invest-
ment-in-africa/.
134. Compagnon & Alejandro, supra note 75.
135. Si, supra note 78.
136. See id.
137. See Feng Jia & Bo Xiaobo, China’s Environmental Law Fails to Effectively Ensure
Fairness, in 1 CHINESE RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENVIRONMENT 285, 285– 94 (Yang
Dongping ed., 2013).
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too few incentives for those who protect it.138
The Ethics Institute of South Africa organized in 2014 a dialogue in
Pretoria for African and Chinese delegates to discuss “Sustainable Business
Relations between China and Africa.”139  The final report concluded that
Chinese companies are starting to implement pollution control practices
and are increasingly promoting the use of clean energy and environmen-
tally friendly practices.140  They are also giving greater attention to the
establishment of standards and reporting on environmental and social
impact assessments.141  In spite of these advances, however, the report said
that Chinese businesses still observe minimal adherence to local environ-
mental standards, rather than a complete adherence to the best environ-
mental management practices.142
V. Moving Polluting Industries to Africa
There is a new concern that China will address domestic industrial
pollution by relocating some of its highest polluting industries (such as the
steel, glass, leather, and cement industries) to Africa, Latin America, East-
ern Europe, and other parts of Asia.143  For example, sulfur dioxide, nitro-
gen dioxide, and dust from heavy manufacturing in Hebei Province are
fouling the air in Beijing.144  The easiest solution is to reduce the number
of highly polluting industries around Beijing, which the government is in
the process of doing.145  At the same time, African countries are pressing
China to invest in more job-creating industries.146
Hebei Iron & Steel, China’s largest producer owned by Hebei Prov-
ince, announced in 2014 that it would build a plant capable of making five
million tons of steel annually in South Africa.147  The company plans to
start production in 2017 and may close its mills in Hebei.148  By 2023,
Hebei provincial authorities hope to relocate offshore the production of
138. See id. at 290.
139. See INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL ETHICS, SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS RELATIONS BETWEEN
CHINA AND AFRICA: REPORT ON THE DIALOGUE IN SOUTH AFRICA 25– 27 (Ignace Haaz ed.,
2015).
140. See id. at 15.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See Dexter Roberts, China’s Plan to Export Pollution, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Nov. 27, 2014) [hereinafter Roberts, China’s Plan], http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/
articles/2014-11-27/chinas-pollution-solution-move-factories-abroad.
144. See Dexter Roberts, Air Pollution Turned This Chinese City into a Ghost Town,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/
2015-02-26/air-pollution-turned-this-chinese-city-into-a-ghost-town.
145. See id.
146. See generally Shuaihua Cheng & Guoyong Liang, Social Responsibility of Chinese
Investment in Africa: What Does It Mean For EU-China Cooperation on Development Policy
Towards Africa?, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (May 6, 2011), http://www
.ictsd.org/bridges-news/trade-negotiations-insights/news/social-responsibility-of-chi
nese-investment-in-africa.
147. Roberts, China’s Plan, supra note 143.
148. See id.
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twenty million tons of steel and thirty million tons of cement.149  In 2015,
Sinosteel announced plans to develop a major steel plant in Kenya.150  The
managing director of Sentuo Steel Limited said that the company is adding
500,000 metric tons annually to the company’s existing 300,000 metric
ton plant at Tema in Ghana.151
Chinese tanneries in Africa have already raised concerns.  China-
Africa Overseas Leather Products SC began operations in Ethiopia in 2010
and almost immediately encountered pollution complaints.152  Forced to
shut down for forty days, the tannery seems to have resolved the
problems.153  Jeronimo Group Industries & Trading PLC, a subsidiary of
Chinese glove-making firm Phiss, has been operating in Somaliland since
2008.154  Local residents complained that the company has been dumping
waste into the river, causing harm to the livestock industry.155  The Somali-
land government has been reluctant to intervene for fear that the interven-
tion would discourage additional foreign investments.156  As the
environmental implications of these industries become fully appreciated,
people in recipient countries will almost certainly ask more questions
about the advisability of accepting highly polluting industries, even though
African governments’ desire to create jobs will likely prevail over environ-
mental concerns.
In response to these concerns, Lin Songtian, Director General of the
Department of African Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China and former ambassador to Liberia and Malawi, said
defensively that the environmental complaints were instigated by the West-
ern media, which is worried that Africa would improve its industrial capac-
ity and achieve political and economic independence.157  He added that
having experienced serious environmental problems in China, his govern-
ment did not want to see African countries following the path of pollution
149. See Sean Silbert, Province Near Beijing Aims to Move Polluting Factories Overseas,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-pollution-
factories-overseas-20141119-story.html.
150. Margaret Wahito, Chinese Steel Maker to Open Mega Plant in Kenya, CAP. FM
KENYA (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/business/2015/03/chinese-steel-
maker-to-open-mega-plant-in-kenya/.
151. New $53M Chinese Steel Company to Boost Ghana Industry, GHANA BUS. NEWS
(June 4, 2015), https://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2015/06/04/new-53m-chinese-
steel-company-to-boost-ghana-industry/.
152. See Li Lianxiang, By the Bootstraps, CHINA DAILY (June 14, 2013), http://
africa.chinadaily.com.cn/weekly/2013-06/14/content_16620709.htm.
153. See id.; Berhanu Fekade, Chinese Tannery Caught Red-Handed While Attempting to
Export Semi-Finished Leather, REPORTER (May 11, 2013), http://www.thereporterethiopia
.com/index.php/news-headlines/item/479-chinese-tannery-caught-red-handed-while-
attempting-to-export-semi-finished-leather.
154. Sean Williams, Chinese Factory Accused of Poisoning Somaliland Water Supplies,
THE GUARDIAN (July 2, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/jul/02/
chinese-factory-somaliland-water.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Lin Songtian, Africa: Continent and China Industrial Capacity Cooperation Aims
for Win-Win, ALLAFRICA (July 13, 2015), http://allafrica.com/stories/201507131170
.html.
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first and cleaning up later.158  China, he said, would help African coun-
tries establish industrial access standards and “will regulate Chinese busi-
nesses to abide by the four principles of industrial capacity
cooperation.”159  This is clearly a situation, however, where African leaders
will have to insist on the highest environmental standards for those indus-
tries that relocate to Africa.
VI. African Environmental Practice and Law
With fifty-four countries in Africa, it is impossible, except at the most
basic level, to generalize about African environmental practices and law.
The 1963 Charter of the Organization of African Unity contained no refer-
ence to environmental protection.160  The adoption of the African Conven-
tion of Nature and Natural Resources (the Algiers Convention) in 1968 was
the first pan-African effort to deal with environmental issues.161  In 1985,
African governments established the African Ministerial Conference on the
Environment (AMCEN) to promote regional cooperation in addressing
environmental concerns.162  AMCEN is now the main policy-making
forum for discussing Africa’s environmental problems.163  African leaders
began to take greater interest in environmental challenges in the late 1980s
and 1990s.164  In 2003, the African Union replaced the Organization of
African Unity and adopted the comprehensive Revised African Convention
on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (the Revised Con-
vention).165  The Revised Convention makes a strong commitment to pov-
erty reduction and socio-economic development.166  Once the Revised
Convention comes into force, it will replace the 1968 Algiers Convention
for those African states that have ratified it.167
While the Algiers Convention had the potential to become a compre-
hensive treaty on the environment for African countries, it never achieved
that goal.168  The 2003 Revised Convention will be an improvement only if
its provisions are adequately financed, effective institutional mechanisms
are put in place, and there is a strong non-compliance mechanism.169  The
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which will have jurisdiction
over matters concerning the Revised Convention, has not yet adjudicated
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Emeka Polycarp Amechi, Linking Environmental Protection and Poverty Reduction
in Africa: An Analysis of the Regional Legal Responses to Environmental Protection, 6 L.
ENV’T & DEV. J. 112, 117 (2010).
161. Id. at 115.
162. Id. at 119.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 117.
165. Id. at 118.
166. Id. at 126.
167. Id.
168. Bolanle T. Erinosho, The Revised African Convention on the Conservation of
Nature and Natural Resources: Prospects for a Comprehensive Treaty for the Management of
Africa’s Natural Resources, 21 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 378, 385 (2013).
169. Id. at 393.
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any cases.170  So far, only eight countries have ratified the Revised Conven-
tion; it will not enter into force until it has been ratified by fifteen African
countries.171  This fact— and the subsequent lack of discussion about the
Revised Convention in African Union meetings— suggest a continuing lack
of priority that African governments give to environmental protection.172
African leaders understand the link between natural resources and eco-
nomic development.173  They must now demonstrate that environmental
protection is not a competing interest for scarce financial resources, but a
complementary one.174
The African Union has developed an Action Plan of the Environment
Initiative of the New Partnership for African Development.175  It identifies
eleven regional environmental issues such as climate change, desertifica-
tion, and integrated waste management as priority program areas for
regional environmental cooperation.176  Like the Revised Convention, it
emphasizes that the environment must be treated in a way that accelerates
poverty reduction and sustainable development.177  A number of African
sub-regional organizations have also taken up environmental issues.  The
Southern African Development Community (SADC) has committed mem-
ber states to sustainable development and ratification of multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements.178  SADC has approved the Environment and
Sustainable Development Policy and Strategy Document and a Protocol on
the Environment.179  The five members of the East African Community rat-
ified a protocol for sustainable development of the Lake Victoria Basin.180
The Senegal River Basin Organization, Niger Basin Authority, and the Nile
Basin Initiative were established to improve water resource
management.181
These continental and sub-regional environmental initiatives have suf-
fered, however, due to slow policy implementation, inadequate environ-
mental legislation at lower level institutions, poor legal enforcement, and
170. Id. at 395.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 393– 95.
173. Id. at 396.
174. Id. at 396– 97.  For a more encouraging account of African countries’ efforts to
combat desertification and Chinese assistance in this regard, see Alioune Thiam, Chal-
lenges in Combating Desertification in Sub-Saharan Africa, Which Role for China?, 1 AFR.
E.-ASIAN AFF.: THE CHINA MONITOR 16, 18– 33 (2014).
175. Id. at 26– 27.
176. Id.
177. Amechi, supra note 160, at 119.
178. Environment & Sustainable Development, SADC (2012), http://www.sadc.int/
issues/environment-sustainable-development/.
179. See id.
180. Protocol for the Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin, Nov. 29, 2003,
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/Lake_Victoria_Basin_
2003.pdf.
181. ANDERS EKBOM, AFRICA ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANCE POLICY BRIEF 1, 14
(2009), http://sidaenvironmenthelpdesk.se/wordpress3/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/
Africa-Environmental-and-Climate-Change-Policy-Brief-20090525.pdf.
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insufficient financial and human capacity to carry out the agreements.182
It has also been difficult to integrate environmental initiatives into national
development plans and poverty reduction strategies.183
The approach of individual African countries towards protection of the
environment varies enormously.184  Some countries have impressive legis-
lation in place, while others lag behind.  Even in the case of countries with
a relatively strong commitment to the environment and reasonably good
legislation, there are serious shortfalls in funding and human capacity to
implement programs to protect the environment.185
In 1997, Ethiopia approved its first comprehensive environmental ini-
tiative, and subsequently implemented strategies and laws to support sus-
tainable development.186  Ethiopia enacted a wide range of legal, policy,
and institutional frameworks regarding the environment, water, forests, cli-
mate change, and biodiversity.187  Ethiopia has also signed a number of
international environmental treaties.188  The African Development Bank
expressed satisfaction with the government’s institutional framework for
natural resource management and the environment.189  Ethiopia takes
environmental protection more seriously than most African countries do,
but it continues to suffer from inadequate implementation and enforce-
ment.190  Pollution monitoring, reporting, and verification of abatement
measures have been weak.  Lack of human capacity has been the main con-
straining factor.191
Mali has relatively well-developed environmental legislation, having
initiated a political and institutional framework dealing with climate
change.192  In 2010, it established the National Agency for Environmental
and Sustainable Development, which was responsible for implementing
environmental policy and integrating bureaucratic responses.193  Mali also
has a strategy for a green economy and climate change.194  In 2011, the
182. Shinn, Environmental Impact, supra note 133.
183. Id.
184. For a detailed review of Chad’s environmental regulations, see Ge´raud Magrin et
al., The Legacy of the Exxon-Doba Project: Petroleum-Related Environmental Regulations in
Chad Prior To CNPC’s Arrival, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES FACING A CHINESE OIL
COMPANY IN CHAD 77, 77-110 (Geert van Vliet & Ge´raud Magrin eds., 2012).
185. See generally EMELIE CE´SAR & ANDERS EKBOM, ETHIOPIA ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLI-
MATE CHANGE POLICY BRIEF (May 27, 2013), http://sidaenvironmentalhelpdesk.se/word-
press3/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Ethiopia-Environmental-and-Climate-Change-
policy-20130527.pdf.
186. Id. at 10.
187. Shinn, China in Africa, supra note 17.
188. Id.
189. CE´SAR & EKBOM, supra note 185, at 12.
190. Shinn, China in Africa, supra note 17.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See OLOF DRAKENBERG & EMELIE CE´SAR, MALI ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE
CHANGE POLICY BRIEF (July 5, 2013), http://sidaenvironmenthelpdesk.se/wordpress3/
wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Mali-Environmental-and-Climate-Change-Policy-Brief-
Final-draft.pdf.
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World Bank improved Mali’s score for environmental policy and institu-
tions.195  In 2012, however, a coup d’e´tat resulted in a ninety percent
reduction in the budget of the Ministry of Environment and Sanitation’s
environmental department.196  In addition, Mali has low regard for envi-
ronmental legislation and weak human capacity for environmental
improvement.197  To make progress, Mali must increase international
financing, improve legal frameworks, and strengthen human capacity.198
Environmental legislation and policy is of reasonable quality in
Mozambique.  Several laws and policies safeguard the environment and
allow communities to benefit from the extraction of local natural
resources.199  Mozambique has signed many of the major multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements.200  The government appears to appreciate the
importance of natural resource management and included sections on the
environment and climate change in its 2011– 2014 Poverty Reduction
Action Program.201  On the other hand, implementation, monitoring, and
the link between policy statements and budget allocations are weak.  Fund-
ing for environmental protection falls below the minimum recommended
by the World Bank.202  There is also poor coordination among the environ-
mental departments in the sector ministries.203
Zambia’s body of environmental law is scattered throughout more
than thirty-three pieces of legislation, assigning responsibilities to at least
ten line ministries.204  The 1997 Environmental Impact Assessment regula-
tions require assessments for all investments that have a major impact on
the environment, as well as adequate environmental mitigation mea-
sures.205  Zambia’s Sixth National Development Plan 2011– 2015 includes
the environment as a cross-cutting issue and addresses climate change.206
The Ministry of Tourism, Environment, and Natural Resources and the
Environmental Council of Zambia have a comprehensive environmental
mandate.  In practice, however, environmental management largely
depends on the interest and competence of line ministries, which have not
prioritized it.207  The environmental institutions are weakly linked to devel-
opment planning, finance, and sector institutions, and lack political power
195. Id.
196. Shinn, China in Africa, supra note 17.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See GUNILLA O¨LUND WINGQVIST, ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
BRIEF— MOZAMBIQUE (Mar. 2013), http://sidaenvironmenthelpdesk.se/wordpress3/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/Mozambique_Env-and-CC-Policy-Brief_March-2013.pdf.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Shinn, China in Africa, supra note 17.
205. Id.
206. REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA, SIXTH NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2011– 2015 38– 39 (Jan.
2011), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTZAMBIA/Resources/SNDP_Final_Draft__
20_01_2011.pdf.
207. Shinn, China in Africa, supra note 17.
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and human capacity.208  They also face severe funding constraints; envi-
ronmental issues are heavily dependent on international funding.209
Thus, Zambia struggles to manage its environment sustainably.210
Most African states have weak bureaucracies.  While their environ-
mental laws are sometimes impressive, implementation is often lacking.211
In many African countries, the environmental laws and standards are
much lower than accepted international norms.212  African governments
have signed many treaties and agreements but have generally failed to artic-
ulate coherent solutions to their environmental problems.213  Given the
weak enforcement of African environmental protection measures, individ-
ual Chinese companies operating in Africa will have discretion as to
whether they assume responsibility for sound environmental practices.
Most African governments do not consider the issue a high priority or do
not have the resources to improve the situation significantly.
VII. Amount and Composition of Chinese FDI to Africa
It is important to put China’s FDI to Africa in the context of all FDI
flows to Africa.  Investment by every country or company that sends FDI to
Africa has potential environmental implications.  Thus, it follows that
Western companies have environmental records in Africa that are similar
to those of Chinese companies in more recent years, given that their cumu-
lative investments far exceed China’s FDI in Africa.214  While this analysis
is not about the environmental impacts of Western companies, it is impor-
tant to recall that the records of some of these companies are also subject to
severe criticism.  It is equally important to understand that cumulative
non-Chinese FDI in Africa is significantly greater than cumulative Chinese
investment.215  Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, China has
become one of the most important sources of FDI for Africa on an annual
basis.216  This phenomenon, combined with China’s perceived environ-
mental lapses, has brought more attention to the environmental impact of
Chinese investment.
Quantifying China’s total cumulative FDI in Africa is difficult.  The
official Chinese government figure is $21.23 billion as of the end of
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Compagnon & Alejandro, supra note 75, at 223.  Negusu Aklilu makes the argu-
ment that African countries must do a better job of passing appropriate environmental
legislation and then enforcing it.  Negusu Aklilu, Greening Africa-China Relations: Afri-
can Agents Punching Below their Weight?, 2 J. CHINA & INT’L REL. 26, 42 (2014).
213. Erinosho, supra note 168, at 396.
214. David Shinn, China’s Investments in Africa, CHINA US FOCUS (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/chinas-investments-in-africa/.
215. Id.
216. See id.
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2012.217  There is the problem noted earlier of defining China’s FDI.
China only began an annual publication of official communiques of FDI,
which it calls outward direct investment (ODI), in 2003.218  China distin-
guishes between financial and non-financial FDI; financial FDI was
excluded from the official figures before 2006.219  The reliability of the
data is limited for several reasons.  The data capture only certain forms of
investment.  The procedures for obtaining permission to invest outside
China are cumbersome, leading some investors— especially in the private
sector— to invest without observing the process.  China also relies on infor-
mation supplied by foreign partners.220  Significant Chinese FDI goes to
Hong Kong and Macau, where some of it continues to other parts of the
world, including Africa.  Such transactions are not captured as Chinese
FDI to Africa.221  The same problem exists with tax havens such as the
British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands.222  The net result is that
cumulative Chinese FDI in Africa is considerably higher than the official
figure, but the actual amount is not known.
Even with an assumption of more Chinese FDI in Africa than acknowl-
edged by the government of China, China’s FDI still falls substantially
below that of several other countries.  For example, at the end of 2012,
American companies had cumulative FDI in Africa totaling $61.4 billion, a
larger figure than even the highest estimates for Chinese FDI in Africa at
that time.223  Of course, American companies have been investing in Africa
over a longer period of time than Chinese companies.  Put differently, the
official figure for China’s investment flow to Africa in 2012 was $2.52 bil-
lion.224  Global FDI flows to Africa in 2012 totaled $55 billion.225  Using
Beijing’s conservative figure, China provided less than five percent of all
FDI going to Africa in 2012.226  The environmental practices of other for-
eign companies investing in Africa vary and there are likely a few with an
equal or worse record than those from China.
The principal recipients of Chinese FDI have been South Africa, Nige-
ria, Algeria, Sudan, Zambia, and Angola.227  They received seventy-five per-
217. INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REP. OF CHINA, CHINA-AFRICA
ECONOMIC AND TRADE COOPERATION 2013, (Aug. 2013) [hereinafter CHINA-AFRICA COOP-
ERATION], http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_2814749]82
986536.htm.
218. See Thierry Pairault, Chinese Direct Investment in Africa, 37 RE´GION ET DE´VELOPPE-
MENT 259, 263 (2013).
219. See id.
220. See id. at 264.
221. See id. at 267.
222. See id. at 267– 68.
223. See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RES. SERV., U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD: TRENDS
AND CURRENT ISSUES 4 (2013).
224. CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION, supra note 217.
225. See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2014 OVERVIEW 3
(2014).
226. See Denise Leung & Lihuan Zhou, Where Are Chinese Investments in Africa
Headed?, WORLD RES. INST. (May 15, 2014), http://www.wri.org/blog/2014/05/where-
are-chinese-investments-africa-headed.
227. Pairault, supra note 218, at 269.
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cent of China’s FDI flows to Africa between 2003 and 2010.228
Unsurprisingly, these countries are well-endowed with either minerals or
oil.229  But, except for Sudan, these are among the primary destinations for
FDI from other countries.230  Excluding the financial sector, in 2009 about
thirty-nine percent of China’s FDI to Africa went into mining and energy,
twenty-five percent into manufacturing, and sixteen percent into construc-
tion.231  These are all sectors that tend to have high environmental impacts.
By the end of 2014, the top five industries for China’s FDI stock in Africa
were construction at 24.7 percent, mining at 24.5 percent, financial ser-
vices at 16.4 percent, manufacturing at 13.6 percent, and scientific
research and technology services at 4.2 percent.232
VIII. Chinese FDI and Economic Sector Impacts
As is the case for most FDI in Africa, Chinese investment is concen-
trated in sectors of the economy that are especially vulnerable to environ-
mental concerns.  China has traditionally been more important as a buyer
of African energy than as a developer of oil and gas.233  Because of Western
sanctions, Sudan was an exception.  China played an early and important
role by investing in the development of Sudan’s oil fields, pipelines, and
refinery infrastructure.234  In recent years, China has devoted more FDI to
developing energy in additional African countries such as Gabon and
Angola.235  Nevertheless, Western companies opened most of Africa’s oil
and gas resources and continue to be the most important players.236  Oil
companies in China and other Western countries have been criticized for
their environmental practices.  For example, in Angola, British Petroleum
and Chevron routinely conduct environmental impact assessments, while
SINOPEC does not.237  On the other hand, the Western majors routinely
flare gas from their wells in the Niger Delta, a process that contributes
significantly to global warming.238
Chinese companies have invested in mining projects throughout much
of Africa, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea,
Zambia, South Africa, and Gabon.  These projects require large initial
228. Id. at 270.
229. See id. at 269.
230. Id. at 269– 70.
231. Id. at 277.
232. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, 2015 REPORT ON THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF CHI-
NESE ENTERPRISES OVERSEAS (2015), http://www.cn.undp.org/content/china/en/home/
library/south-south-cooperation/2015-report-on-the-sustainable-development-of-chi-
nese-enterprise.html.
233. See Stephanie Hanson, China, Africa, and Oil, WASH. POST (June 9, 2008), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/09/AR2008060900714
.html.
234. See POWER, supra note 84, at 216.
235. See Hanson, supra note 233.
236. See id.
237. See POWER, supra note 84, at 215; Tan-Mullins, supra note 44, at 53– 54.
238. POWER, supra note 84, at 215– 16.  For a broader discussion of China’s environ-
mental interaction in Africa, see id. at 216– 20.
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investments in technology, equipment, and infrastructure, so China’s state-
owned companies tend to dominate in this sector.239  The mines are some-
times located in ecologically fragile areas with a high risk of environmental
degradation.240  The mines often generate greenhouse gases and solid and
liquid waste, including hazardous products like cyanide and mercury.241
The mines can also harm the mining communities and persons living in
the vicinity of the mining activity.242  Chinese companies often negotiate
mining concessions in the absence of competitive bidding and environmen-
tal assessments.243  African governments contribute to the problem by fail-
ing to insist on environmental impact statements and enforce existing
environmental regulations.244  In recent years, however, Chinese compa-
nies have paid more attention to mitigating the harmful impacts.245
While some Chinese fishing companies have FDI in Africa, most Chi-
nese activity involves offshore fishing in accordance with treaties and
agreements not directly linked to FDI.  About two-thirds of China’s global
catch comes from the seas adjacent to Africa.246  The China National Fish-
eries Corporation has eight offices in Africa, and factories in Mauritania
and Senegal.247  China Fishery Group Limited also has investments in
Africa, although only about six percent of its 2014 revenue came from Afri-
can waters.248  Chinese fishing vessels have been criticized for worsening
food insecurity in Africa because they catch small species such as mack-
erel, which is the main source of food and income for small-scale African
fishermen.249  A more serious problem resulting from this illegal fishing is
the depletion of the marine resource base and the attendant ecological
impacts.250  Chinese companies are also accused of failing to respect fish-
ing quotas and infringing fishing zone regulations.251
239. See id. at 207.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See id.; Tan-Mullins, supra note 44, at 54.
243. See POWER, supra note 84, at 204.
244. See id.
245. See id. at 217.
246. Id. at 202; Daniel Pauly et al., China’s Distant-Water Fisheries in the 21st Century,
15 FISH & FISHERIES 474, 475, 483 (2004).
247. POWER, supra note 84, at 202; China National Fisheries Corporation— Group Head-
quarters, FISH INFO. & SERVICES (2015), www.fis.com/fis/companies/details.asp?1=e&
company_id=32635.
248. Press Release, China Fishery Group Ltd., Full Year Financial Statement and Divi-
dend Announcement for the Year Ended September 28, 2014 (Nov. 22, 2014), www.
chinafisherygroup.com/ir/newsroom.html/.
249. POWER, supra note 84, at 203.
250. Id. at 208.
251. Id. at 203, 208.  Greenpeace reports how the China National Fisheries Corpora-
tion and other Chinese companies under-declare the gross tonnage of their fishing ves-
sels, whether Chinese flagged or owned and operated under other flags through joint
ventures, and jeopardizes the sustainable and equitable exploitation of West African
marine resources. GREENPEACE, SCAM ON THE AFRICAN COAST: THE HIDDEN FACE OF CHI-
NESE AND JOINT-VENTURE VESSELS TONNAGE FRAUD IN SENEGAL, GUINEA BISSAU AND GUINEA
(May 2015), http://www.greenpeace.org/africa/Global/africa/graphics/Amigo/Scam%
20on%20the%20African%20Coast%20FINAL%20PROOF(1).pdf.
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China is the largest importer of Africa’s tropical wood, receiving more
than three-quarters of its timber exports, mostly in the form of raw logs
until prohibited by African governments.252  While most of this activity
constitutes trade, some of it involves FDI by Chinese logging and timber
trading companies.  By 2010, Chinese companies owned about twenty-five
percent of the timber concessions in Gabon.253  Increasingly, Chinese
companies have left trading to become concession holders in order to
ensure a steady supply of timber for the Chinese market.254  For example,
more than ninety percent of Mozambique’s timber goes to China, while
Equatorial Guinea exports about seventy percent of its wood products to
China, the Republic of the Congo exports about fifty percent to China, and
Gabon exports about forty percent to China.255  Gabon is Africa’s largest
timber exporter and in 2009 Gabon provided almost four percent of
China’s total timber imports.256
Poor forest governance in Africa has resulted in serious unsustainable
or illegal harvesting.  This has caused the loss of biodiversity and the abuse
of forest communities’ rights.  For example, the Hong Kong-owned
Vicwood Pacific acquired the Cameroon subsidiaries of the Thanry Group,
one of the largest logging companies in the Congo River Basin.257  Came-
roon exports about eleven percent of its timber to China.258  Between 2000
and 2002, the Thanry Group was fined more than $1.3 million for violating
forestry laws, including cutting undersized trees, logging outside legal
boundaries, and logging in unallocated concessions.259  A recent investiga-
tive study of China’s importation of illegal timber from Cameroon con-
cluded that it might jeopardize Cameroon’s agreement with the European
Union to fight illegal logging and illicit timber commerce.260
The Center for International Forestry Research concluded in a review
on Chinese forest practices in four African countries that Chinese compa-
nies have a tendency to violate local laws alongside African counterparts
and some European companies.261  The violations, which sometimes
252. The Africa-China Timber Trade: Diverse Business Models Call for Specialized Policy
Responses, CTR. FOR INT’L. FORESTRY RES. 1 (2014) [hereinafter Africa-China Timber
Trade], http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/infobrief/4518-brief.pdf.
253. Id. at 3 (finding China’s portion of Gabon’s total concessions went from 1.08
percent to twenty-five percent from 1999 to 2009).
254. Id. at 3– 4.
255. Kerstin Canby, China and the Global Market for Forests and Livelihoods, FOREST
TRENDS (2008), http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_1033.pdf.
256. POWER, supra note 84, at 203.
257. Michelle Chan-Fishel, Environmental Impact: More of the Same?, in AFRICAN PER-
SPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA 139, 146 (Firoze Manji & Stephen Marks eds., 2007).
258. Xiufang Sun, Forest Products Trade Between China and Africa, FOREST TRENDS
(April 2014), at 20.
259. Chan-Fishel, supra note 257, at 146– 47. Accord Alison Hoare, Illegal Logging and
the Related Trade: What Progress and Where Next, CHATHAM HOUSE (July 15, 2015),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/tackling-illegal-logging-and-related-trade-
what-progress-and-where-next.
260. Kingsley M. Nfor, Chinese Capital Drives Deforestation in Cameroon, THE STAN-
DARD-TRIBUNE (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.standard-tribune.com/?p=3056.
261. Africa-China Timber Trade, supra note 252, at 7.
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involve the active participation of African government officials, include
abuse of permits and concession licenses, bribery, operating without man-
agement plans, under-reporting export volume, smuggling raw logs, and
harvesting and transporting undesignated species.262  If these practices by
both Chinese and non-Chinese companies continue, the unsustainability
of Africa’s hardwood timber will be the greatest threat to the
environment.263
China’s government is sensitive to the criticism encountered by its
companies in the forestry sector and has made progress in countering ille-
gal logging.264  In 2009, the State Forestry Administration and the Minis-
try of Commerce issued voluntary guidelines that encouraged Chinese
companies to manage, utilize, and protect overseas forests in order to play a
positive role in sustainable development of global forest resources.265  In
2013, the International Institute for Environment and Development, the
Chinese Academy of Forestry, and the Global Environmental Institute held
a two day meeting in Beijing to discuss the perception and evidence con-
cerning China-Africa forest governance from both the Chinese and African
perspectives.266  In 2014, China co-hosted an international workshop on
promoting legal and sustainable trade and investment in forest products,
where it discussed its draft guidelines for Chinese companies.267  The
Environmental Investigation Agency praised the process but argued that
the draft guidelines will be ineffective because they are voluntary and too
limited in scope.268
The environmental issue for which China has attracted the most criti-
cism is the importation of products taken from African endangered spe-
cies, especially elephant ivory and rhino horn.269  China is the world’s
262. Id. at 7– 8.
263. See James Meyers, China in Africa’s Forests, INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T & DEV. (Mar.
20, 2013), http://www.iied.org/china-africa-forests.
264. Laura Wellesley, Trade in Illegal Timber: The Response in China, CHATHAM HOUSE
(Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/trade-illegal-timber-
response-china.
265. See generally A Guide on Sustainable Overseas Forests Management and Utilization
by Chinese Enterprises, ST. FORESTRY ADMIN. (May 6, 2010), www.forestry.gov.cn/portal/
main/s/224/content-401396.html.
266. K. Tran-Thanh et al., China-Africa Forest Governance Learning Platform: Report of
an Inception Event and Future Agenda, INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T & DEV. (2013), http://
pubs.iied.org/pdfs/G03633.pdf.
267. See International Workshop on Promoting Legal and Sustainable Trade and Invest-
ment of Forest Products, FOREST TRENDS (2014), http://www.forest-trends.org/docu-
ments/files/doc_4363.pdf.
268. Envtl. Investigation Agency, Environmental Investigation Agency comments on
the draft Guidelines for Overseas Sustainable Forest Products Trade and Investment by
Chinese Enterprises (July 2014), http://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/EIA-
Comments-on-China-Guidelines-July-2014-English_Final.pdf.
269. Michael McCarthy, Top of the Conference Agenda: The Last Chance to Save the
Rhino, THE INDEPENDENT (Feb. 28, 2013), www.independent.co.uk/environment/nature/
top-of-the-conference-agenda-the-last-chance-to-save-the-rhino-8513792.
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largest importer of illegal ivory.270  The poaching of African elephants has
reached the point where it threatens the long-term viability of the spe-
cies.271  While most of this activity falls into the category of illegal trade
involving African suppliers and Chinese merchants living in both Africa
and China, some of it has indirect links to Chinese FDI.  Chinese timber
companies operating in Mozambique have been charged with adding ele-
phant tusks to shipping containers of wood products destined for
China.272  In 2011, for example, 126 tusks were found in a container of
timber belonging to a Chinese company, Tianhe.273  Chinese nationals
also play a major role in the illegal trade of rhino horn.  Almost eighty
percent of the reported seizures of rhino horn in Asia, the largest market
for the product, between 2009 and 2012 took place in China.274  The
influx of Chinese immigrants to southern Africa led to a rise in the traffick-
ing, although Vietnamese nationals are beginning to dominate the trade.275
Chinese rhino horn smugglers are also linked to the abalone smuggling
market in South Africa, a market that is dominated by Chinese
smugglers.276
On the other hand, in recent years China has become the single most
important source of financing for, and builder of, hydropower dams in
Africa.277  These projects are done under contract with African govern-
270. Fergus Ryan, China and US Agree on ivory ban in bid to end illegal trade globally,
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 26, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/
26/china-and-us-agree-on-ivory-ban-in-bid-to-end-illegal-trade-globally.
271. See Yufang Gao & Susan G. Clark, Elephant Ivory Trade in China: Trends and
Drivers, 180 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 23, 29 (2014).  Retired National Basketball Asso-
ciation star, Yao Ming, has become a spokesperson for saving the African elephant by
discouraging the purchase of ivory.  Bryan Walsh, 10 Questions with Yao Ming, TIME (Dec.
4, 2014), http://time.com/3617658/10-questions-with-yao-ming/.  China has worked
cooperatively with South Africa and Kenya to develop frameworks to staunch the illegal
trade in wildlife, but the problem continues to increase.  Meryl Burgess & Harrie
Esterhuyse, Policy Briefing, Preparing for FOCAC VI: China-South Africa Co-operation in
Conservation and Renewable Energy, CTR. FOR CHINESE STUD., STELLENBOSCH U. 2 (Aug.
2015).  The Chinese embassy in Addis Ababa (a key hub for the transport of ivory to
Asia) and the Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Authority hosted a workshop in 2015 to
address the illegal ivory trade.  Key officials from China concerned with the issue
addressed the participants. See China Joins Ethiopia to Address Ivory Trafficking, TRAFFIC
(May 14, 2015), http://www.traffic.org/home/2015/5/14/china-joins-ethiopia-to-add
ress-ivory-trafficking.html.
272. Huang Hongxiang, The Chinese Ivory-smugglers in Africa, CHINADIALOGUE (Nov.
27, 2013), http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/6540-The-Chinese-
ivory-smugglers-in-Africa.
273. Id.
274. Liu Hongqiao, Is China’s Appetite for Rhino Horn Increasing?, CHINADIALOGUE
(Dec. 16, 2013), https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/6580-Is-China-
s-appetite-for-rhino-horn-increasing-.
275. Id.
276. Huang Hongxiang, Rhino Horn Trade Thrives in Jo’burg, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Oct.
4, 2013), http://mg.co/za/article/2013-10-04-00-rhino-horn-trade-thrives-in-joburg.
277. See Peter Bosshard, China Conquers Africa’s Hydropower Market, INT’L RIVERS
(Aug. 1, 2006), http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources-china-conquers-africa%E2
%80%99s-hydropower-market-1800; Terri Hathaway, What is Driving Dams in Africa?,
INT’L RIVERS (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/what-is-driv-
ing-dams-in-africa-1695.
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ments and do not qualify as FDI.278  These projects, however, have both
important positive and potentially negative environmental impacts.  On the
positive side, the dams provide a clean source of power that is usually more
affordable than energy produced from sources with higher carbon emis-
sions.279  On the negative side, some but not all of these projects had envi-
ronmental, social, economic, and cultural costs.280  Chinese, German, and
French companies built the Merowe Dam on the fourth cataract of the Nile
in Sudan, and China and Arab countries financed the dam.281  It never had
a proper environmental impact statement and displaced more than 50,000
people from the Nile Valley.282  China’s Export-Import Bank financed the
Mphanda Nkuwa Dam on the Zambezi River in Mozambique.283  It did not
have an adequate environmental impact assessment and could derail
efforts to restore the lower Zambezi Delta.284  China is building the Bui
Dam on the Volta River in Ghana.285  It will flood nearly a quarter of Bui
National Park, destroying habitat for hippos and causing the resettlement
of 2,600 people.286  China’s biggest bank provided a $500 million equip-
ment loan for the Gibe III Dam on the Omo River in Ethiopia.287  Environ-
mentalists claim Gibe III will have devastating social and environmental
impacts on the Lower Omo Valley and Lake Turkana in neighboring
Kenya.288
Wind and solar power have minimal environmental downsides.289
China is the world’s largest manufacturer and exporter of solar panels.290
Africa remains a small but growing percentage of its export market.291
China is demonstrating increasing interest in small renewable energy
projects both as a way to make money for its companies and to assist Afri-
can countries in the development of this sector.292  Chinese companies
such as Yingli Solar and Suntech Power Holdings are establishing joint ven-
tures in South Africa, Benin, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique.293  China’s
278. See, e.g., Chinese Dams in Africa, INT’L RIVERS, http://www.internationalrivers
.org/campaigns/chinese-dams-in-africa (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
279. POWER, supra note 84, at 210.
280. Id.
281. Tan-Mullins, supra note 44, at 54.
282. Chinese Dams in Africa, supra note 278.
283. Id.; Yimin, supra note 1, at 387.
284. POWER, supra note 84, at 211; Yimin, supra note 1, at 387; Chinese Dams in
Africa, supra note 278.
285. Chinese Dams in Africa, supra note 278.
286. Id.; POWER, supra note 84, at 211.
287. Chinese Dams in Africa, supra note 278.
288. Id. For additional information on China’s role in building the Merowe Dam, see
Bosshard, supra note 83, at 3– 4.
289. See BJO¨RN CONRAD ET AL., TOWARDS AN ENERGIZING PARTNERSHIP?: EXPLORING
CHINA’S ROLE AS CATALYST OF RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 21– 22 (2011).
290. See id. at 31.
291. See id.
292. Harrie Esterhuyse, Focusing FOCAC on Bankability: Turning Ink on Paper into
Renewable Energy Power, CTR. FOR CHINESE STUD. COMMENT. (Sept. 14, 2015), http://
www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/CCS_FOCAC_Funding_for_Renewable_
Energy_HE_2015_1.pdf.
293. Id. at 17, 32, 40; POWER, supra note 84, at 205.
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Hanergy Group announced it is investing $1 billion to construct a 400
megawatt solar power plant in Ghana.294  In 2014, Chinese solar manufac-
turer Jinko Solar Holding Company opened a factory in Cape Town, South
Africa, making it the first Chinese producer of solar panels in Africa.295
Chinese wind turbine manufacturers such as the China Longyuan Power
Group are also expanding into African markets.296  The company
announced the development of two wind farms in Northern Cape Province
of South Africa of 100 and 144 megawatts each.297  These developments
show that Chinese trade and FDI are making a positive contribution to
Africa’s environment in the wind and solar sectors.
IX. Chinese FDI and Africa’s Environment: Case Studies
The examples of Chinese investments discussed below demonstrate
the generally negative impacts of Chinese investments on the environments
of African countries.  Reports of neutral or even positive environmental
impacts of FDI from any company, irrespective of nationality, are rarely
documented.  As a result, this section presents an overtly negative and
therefore potentially biased account.  Regardless of potentially one-sided
environmental findings, it is undisputed that Chinese companies must
improve their environmental practices as they continue to invest in African
countries.298
A. Oil Sector Investment in Sudan and South Sudan
Chevron discovered oil in Sudan in the late 1970s and was responsible
for the early development of oil wells in the region.299  As a result of contin-
uing civil war in Sudan, however, and worsening relations between Sudan
and the United States, Chevron sold its concessions in 1992.300  The China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was one of the first foreign com-
panies to express an interest in taking over Chevron’s concession.301  In
1995, China signed an agreement with Sudan for oil concessions in
294. China to Help Ghana Construct 1 Bln USD Solar Plant, XINHUA (Mar. 20, 2015),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03-20/c_134081951.htm.
295. Ehran Goossens, JinkoSolar Africa Plant Is First for China Manufacturers, BLOOM-
BERG (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-11/jinkoso-
lar-africa-plant-is-first-for-china-manufacturers.
296. CONRAD, supra note 289, at 17, 32– 33, 41; POWER, supra note 84, at 205.
297. CONRAD, supra note 289, at 40; Mao Pengfei, Longyuan Expands Out of China
With SA Win, WIND POWER MONTHLY (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.windpowermonthly
.com/article/1218678/longyuan-expands-china-sa-win. See also Burgess & Esterhuyse,
supra note 271, at 3– 4 (noting that problems in the renewable energy sector have caused
Chinese companies to become more risk averse, resulting in a reduction in FDI or an
increase in the use of local partnerships in an effort to mitigate risk).
298. Shinn, Environmental Impact, supra note 133.
299. Fact Sheet Two: A History of Oil in Sudan, UNDERSTANDING SUDAN (2009), http://
understandingsudan.berkeley.edu/oil/oilresources/l2fs2-historyofoilinsudan.pdf.
300. Id.
301. Ismail S.H. Ziada, Oil in Sudan: Facts and Impacts on Sudanese Domestic and
International Relations 5 (2007) (unpublished Doctorate manuscript) (on file with the
Universidad Autonoma de Madrid).
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exchange for credit at reduced interest rates, thereby helping China’s oil
companies invest in Sudan.302  In late 1996, CNPC took the largest share
(forty percent) of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, the
umbrella organization responsible for developing the oil fields in Sudan.303
In 2000, CNPC established the Petrodar Operating Company, which
included the Malaysian national oil company, several minority stakehold-
ers, and eventually SINOPEC and the Indian national oil company.304
CNPC subsequently developed the pipeline and refinery infrastructure and
drew on the services of subsidiary Chinese companies for oil services and
construction.305  Among these companies were the Zhongyuan Petroleum
Engineering Company, Great Wall Drilling Company, and the China Petro-
leum Engineering and Construction Corporation.306  Through these vari-
ous projects, CNPC financed most of Sudan’s oil sector development.307
Between 1999 and 2011, Sudan was China’s sixth largest source of
imported oil, supplying on average five and a half percent of total imports
annually.308
Sudanese oil production peaked in 2007 at about 483,000 barrels per
day.309  A natural decline in small and medium-sized oil fields as well as a
lack of investment in secondary recovery resulted in falling production.310
The independence of South Sudan in 2011 and subsequent division of the
country left about seventy-five percent of known oil reserves in South
Sudan and twenty-five percent in Sudan.311  These divisions led to disputes
between Sudan and South Sudan over fees for use of the pipeline infra-
structure in Sudan and led to a lengthy shutdown of production in South
Sudan.312  Not long after the shutdown was resolved, civil war broke out in
South Sudan in late 2013, significantly reducing production and forcing
the evacuation of hundreds of Chinese workers from the oil fields.313
The development of oil fields required seismic surveying and led to
hundreds of kilometers of bulldozed tracks, destroying farmland and
increasing deforestation.314  Road construction disrupted water flows,
which damaged irrigation systems and forced the evacuation of several
302. Ben Wang, China’s Oil Diplomacy and State-Backed Investments in the Partition of
Sudan, 2 PENN ST. J. INT’L AFF. 9, 10– 11 (2012).
303. LUKE PATEY, THE NEW KINGS OF CRUDE: CHINA, INDIA, AND THE GLOBAL STRUCTURE
FOR OIL IN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN 61– 65 (2014).
304. Id. at 106.
305. Id. at 113.
306. Id. at 112– 13.
307. Email from Deborah Brautigam, Director, SAIS China Afr. Res. Initiative, to
author (Mar. 10, 2015 12:50 EST) (on file with author).
308. PATEY, supra note 303, at 118.
309. DANIEL LARGE & LUKE PATEY, RIDING THE SUDANESE STORM: CHINA, INDIA, RUSSIA,
BRAZIL & THE TWO SUDANS 12 (2014).
310. Id.
311. South Sudan Country Profile, BBC NEWS (July 5, 2011), www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-africa-14069082.
312. South Sudan Restarts Oil Production, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2013), http://www.ft
.com/cms/s/0/f570b2a6-9f62-11e2-b4b6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3qV1Z0dsB.
313. LARGE & PATEY, supra note 309.
314. PATEY, supra note 303, at 189.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-1\CIN102.txt unknown Seq: 32 19-MAY-16 16:52
56 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 49
communities.315  The discharge of contaminated “produced water” from
oil reservoirs and the improper disposal of drilling mud and other wastes
were the most damaging impacts on the environment.  These practices
killed livestock and caused serious illnesses in nearby communities.316
Chinese companies tried to mitigate the negative environmental impacts of
oil production by building water wells, schools, and hospitals in affected
communities.317  Chinese companies also contributed to improvements in
agriculture, new road construction, better access to markets, and wider
mobile phone coverage.318  Despite these contributions, Luke Patey, who
has carefully researched the China-Sudan oil relationship, concluded that
it was no surprise that CNPC engaged in environmental degradation
because “the company has a deplorable track record in environmental man-
agement at home.”319
Despite Chinese companies’ impacts on the environment, Sudan’s
Ministry of Energy and Mining is responsible for overseeing environmental
laws and regulations in the oil sector.320  Sudan’s Petroleum Wealth Act
and Environmental Protection Act set down the rules for environmental
preservation.321  These Acts, however, make clear that Sudanese govern-
ment officials were more interested in advancing the oil industry than
implementing environmental laws.322  Absence of careful government
supervision encourages oil companies to engage in poor environmental
practices,323 and environmental impact assessments in Sudan are often
substandard and conducted only after operations have begun.324  Others
were shelved after completion with little follow-up.325  As a result, Chinese
315. Id.
316. Id. For environmental complaints in South Sudanese communities, see Leben N.
Moro, Chinese Oil Companies & Local Communities in Unity State, South Sudan, in OIL,
SECURITY, AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 26, 26 (Saferworld ed., 2013); Ranga Gworo, Oil
Companies & Community Relations in Unity State, in OIL, SECURITY, AND COMMUNITY
ENGAGEMENT 36, 37 (Saferworld ed., 2013).
317. PATEY, supra note 303, at 171.
318. Id. at 189.
319. Id.  But see Qian Zhen, Chinese Oil Companies in South Sudan’s Conflict Environ-
ment, in OIL, SECURITY, AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 31, 32– 33 (Saferworld ed., 2013)
(discussing the efforts undertaken by Chinese corporations to offset negative environ-
mental impacts in Africa).
320. Petroleum, Mining, & Industries, GOV. OF THE REP. OF S. SUDAN, http://www.goss
.org/index.php/ministries/petroleum-mining (last visited Nov. 9, 2015).
321. Osman Mirghani Mohamed Ali, The Role of EIA Studies in the Management &
Conservation of Cultural Heritage in the Sudan, in CULTURAL HERITAGE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
IN AFRICA 44, 45 (Herman Kiriam et al. eds., 2010).
322. Asim I El Moghraby, State of the Environment in Sudan, in 2 ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT ASSESSMENT TRAINING RESOURCE MANUAL, UNEP 27, 35 (2002).
323. S Sudan Official: Oil Companies Did ‘Nothing’ to Protect Environment, RADIO
TAMAZUJ (Sept. 23, 2015), https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/s-sudan-official-oil-com-
panies-did-nothing-protect-environment.
324. Luke A. Patey, Crude Days Ahead? Oil and the Resource Curse in Sudan, 109 AFR.
AFF. 617, 633 (2010).
325. Id.
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companies and oil workers became the targets of violence by local
communities.326
B. Oil Sector Investment in Chad
ExxonMobil, Chevron, and Malaysia’s PETRONAS have the longest
and most significant engagement in Chad’s oil sector, which has been pro-
ducing oil since 2003.327  When China resumed diplomatic relations with
Chad in 2006, investment in the oil industry was at the top of China’s
agenda.328  CNPC purchased all the shares related to a permit in Chad that
were held by a Canadian oil company.329  CNPC then solicited $1 billion
in Chinese financing to build a 311-kilometer pipeline connecting oil fields
in the Bongor Basin in east-central Chad to a refinery about fifty kilometers
north of the capital of N’Djamena, in what was known as the Roˆnier pro-
ject.330  While the project is innovative, the scope is small.  The refinery
has a maximum production capacity of 40,000 barrels a day, but is
processing well under this amount.331  There have been persistent disagree-
ments between CNPC and the government of Chad on the price of fuel
produced in the refinery, resulting in the closure of the refinery at one
point.332
Environmental regulations for the oil sector are more developed in
China than in Chad, but earlier experience in Chad with Western oil com-
panies and the World Bank resulted in relatively sophisticated standards
that were usually enforced.333  It is not clear if China’s laws and regula-
tions relating to environmental impact assessments apply to the project in
Chad.334  In any event, CNPC began an environmental assessment of the
Roˆnier project in 2008, which was completed in about a year.335  The
CNPC China Design Institute conducted the study on the refinery while a
Chadian engineering consultancy firm reviewed the oilfields and pipe-
326. PATEY, supra note 303, at 189– 90.  Luke Patey commented to the author in Wash-
ington on October 20, 2014 that CNPC has been responsible for a lot of environmental
damage in South Sudan, just as it has been in China.  On the other hand, he noted that
Chinese oil companies operating in Canada follow environmental regulations and do
not abuse the environment.  Patey concluded that it is up to the host government to
enforce local laws.
327. ROMAIN DITTGEN & DANIEL LARGE, CHINA’S GROWING INVOLVEMENT IN CHAD:
ESCAPING ENCLOSURE? 5, 10 (2012).
328. See generally id.
329. Shinn, Environmental Impact, supra note 133.
330. Id.
331. DITTGEN & LARGE, supra note 327, at 9– 12; Ge´raud Magrin & Gilbert Maoundo-
nodji, The Roˆnier Project for China and for Chad: The Challenges of a New Petroleum
Adventure, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES FACING A CHINESE OIL COMPANY IN CHAD
119, 124-25 (Geert van Vliet & Ge´raud Magrin eds., 2012).
332. DITTGEN & LARGE, supra note 327, at 15– 18.
333. Yiran Lin et al., CNPC’s HSE System Put to the Test in Chad, in THE ENVIRONMEN-
TAL CHALLENGES FACING A CHINESE OIL COMPANY IN CHAD 151, 155 (Geert van Vliet &
Ge´raud Magrin eds., 2012).
334. Id. at 166.
335. Id. at 168– 69.
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lines.336  Neither study was fully disclosed to the public, which is contrary
to Chadian law but in compliance with Chinese law.337  Construction
began in the oil fields and along the pipeline route before approval of the
environmental assessment.338  This was contrary to both Chadian and Chi-
nese law.339  The study on the refinery (sixty percent owned by CNPC and
forty percent owned by the government of Chad) was completed and
approved by the appropriate ministries before the start of construction.340
Once construction was underway, residents complained about traffic
noise and air pollution caused by CNPC truck convoys, and drew attention
to untreated wastewater at one of the company’s waste sorting plants.341
CNPC took corrective measures.342  There was reportedly minimal impact
on biodiversity and wildlife in the project’s vicinity.343  CNPC agreed to
offer compensation to villagers whose agricultural land had been displaced
but at a less generous level than the compensation Exxon had previously
provided.344  A study in 2009 and 2010 that compared the Exxon-led
investment in Chad to the Roˆnier project concluded that both companies
experienced relatively similar non-compliances during the construction
phase related to dust, noise, quarries, waste material, road accidents, com-
pensation, and other concerns.345  Both companies addressed the
problems quickly.346  The major difference was Exxon’s transparency,
while CNPC established extremely restrictive procedures for communica-
tion with external stakeholders.347  Dialogue posed a real challenge for
CNPC, which tended to meet only with officials in the Ministry of Petro-
leum, while Chinese executives working with CNPC rarely met with local
authorities.348
CNPC’s situation in Chad subsequently deteriorated.  In 2013,
Chadian oil minister Djerassem le Bemadjiel suspended all CNPC opera-
tions for flagrant environmental regulation violations while exploring for
crude oil.349  The minister alleged that CNPC did not have the equipment
for cleaning up oil spills and intentionally allowed oil to spill.350  In 2014,
Chad withdrew five exploration permits after CNPC refused to pay a $1.2
336. Id.
337. Id. at 169– 70.
338. Id. at 170.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 169.
341. Id. at 172.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 175.
344. Id. at 178.
345. Id. at 181.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 181– 82.
348. Id. at 182– 84.
349. Bate Felix, Chad Suspends China’s CNPC Unit Over Environment, REUTERS (Aug.
14, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/14/us-chad-china-cnpc-
idUSBRE97D0VN20130814.
350. Chad Suspends Chinese Oil Company for Environmental Violations, DAILY NATION
(Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/africa/Chad+suspends+Chinese+oil+
company+for+environmental+violations/-/1066/1946990/-/y15l18/-/index.html.
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billion fine for “unacceptable practices” that led to oil spills around drilling
sites.351  The Chadian government also announced that it intended to press
charges against CNPC at courts in N’Djamena and Paris.352  At the end of
2014, the minister announced that CNPC agreed to pay $400 million in
compensation for environmental violations and to give Chad a ten percent
share in its active oilfields as well as a twenty-five percent stake in future
productive fields.353  Chad agreed to drop its arbitration case against
CNPC, and allow it to export oil through the Chad– Cameroon pipeline.354
It is possible that the alleged environmental violations were a ploy by Chad
to force China to pay more for its oil concessions.
C. Mining Investments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
In 2008, a consortium of Chinese companies (sixty-eight percent
stake) and the DRC’s Ge´camines (thirty-two percent stake) signed a joint
venture agreement under the name Sino-Congolais des Mines
(Sicomines).355  The package included both development assistance and
FDI.356  The lead Chinese company is China Railway Engineering Corpora-
tion, subsequently joined by Sinohydro, Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, and
China Machinery Engineering Corporation.357  The original agreement,
which was not initially made publicly available, was said to constitute a $9
billion loan from China for both mining investment and national infra-
structure to be repaid with profits from Sicomines’ copper and cobalt
mines.358  After the Paris Club donors and International Monetary Fund
raised concerns about the loan’s negative impact on the DRC’s debt, the
project was scaled back in 2009 to an estimated $6 billion: $3 billion for
national infrastructure and $3 billion for the mining investment.359
The agreement included mining rights for Sicomines in Ge´camines’
concession near Kolwezi, known as Dikulwe-Mashamba (DIMA), one of the
351. M&G Africa Reporter & AFP, Chad Scraps Chinese Oil Permits Over Alleged Envi-
ronmental Violations, MAIL & GUARDIAN AFR. (Dec. 10, 2014), http://mgafrica.com/arti-
cle/2014-08-11-chad-scraps-chinese-oil-permits-over-alleged-environmental-violations.
352. Chad Withdraws Chinese Exploration Permits, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 10, 2014), http://
www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/08/chad-withdraws-chinese-exploration-permits-
2014810124614151839.html. See Chad Uses Environmental Rules to Keep Tight Grip on
Oil Sector, WORLD POL. REV. (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/
trend-lines/14202/chad-uses-environmental-rules-to-keep-tight-grip-on-oil-sector.
353. Settlement is Reached with CNPC, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 5, 2014), http://country
.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=672467451&Country=Chad&topic=Economy&subtopic
=Forecast&subsubtopic=Economic+growth&u=1&pid=113525195&oid=113525195&
uid=1.
354. Id.
355. Johanna Jansson, The Sicomines Agreement: Change and Continuity in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo’s International Relations 12, 23 (South African Inst. of Int’l
Affairs, Occasional Paper No. 97, 2011).
356. Id. at 12.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 10, 11, 15.
359. Id. at 10, 14.
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world’s largest confirmed copper reserves.360  DIMA contains an estimated
ten million tons of copper and cobalt, profits from which will be divided
between China and the DRC in accordance with their sixty-eight percent
and thirty-two percent ownership stakes.361  The DIMA concession is
located largely within long-standing Ge´camines pits, where deforestation
occurred many years ago and little additional impact on forests is
expected.362  New quarries may be opened, however, with environmental
impacts.363  The law requires approval of an environmental mitigation and
rehabilitation plan, an environmental impact assessment, and a project
environmental management plan.364  There is concern that the Chinese
companies and the DRC signed the agreement without any prior assess-
ments or plans.365  It is also unclear who is to implement any environmen-
tal plans due to the ownership structure of the joint venture and the fact
that the DIMA concession is a Ge´camines holding.366  During early pros-
pecting, Sicomines reportedly destroyed some agricultural fields and dis-
turbed local schools.367  Additionally, approximately 200 local residents
were displaced without compensation,368  and there is a possibility that
thousands of residents could be evicted.369
A representative of the embassy of China in Kinshasa said his govern-
ment does not have responsibility for environmental impact statements or
their implementation, but Chinese companies are familiar with them.  Chi-
nese investment banks require such statements but are not in a position to
enforce their implementation.370  Sinohydro did submit an environmental
and social management plan, but it is unclear if other Chinese companies
submitted plans and assessments and, if so, whether they had been
approved.371  Similar to other African countries, Chinese companies have
been reluctant to make public plans and assessments associated with envi-
ronmental impacts.372  As a result, the perception of Chinese inattention to
the environment may be more negative than the situation merits.373  In the
360. Louis Putzel & Noel Kabuyaya, Chinese Aid, Trade and Investment and the Forests
of the Democratic Republic of Congo 25 (Ctr. For Int’l. Forestry Research, Working Paper
No. 82, 2011).
361. Id. at 25.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 25, 26.
364. Id. at 26.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 26– 27.
370. Id. at 12.
371. Id.
372. See Claude Kabemba, The Dragon is Not Green Enough: The Potential Environmen-
tal Impact of Chinese Investment in the DRC, in CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON
CHINA IN AFRICA 139, 148– 49 (Axel Harneit-Sievers et al. eds., 2010).
373. See, e.g., Hans E. Petersen & Sanne van der Lugt, Chinese Participation in African
Infrastructure Development: The Case of the DRC and Zambia, Report written for the
China-DAC Study Group Event on Infrastructure (2010), http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2011/05/Petersen_Lugt_ENG.pdf.  See also Kabemba, supra note 372, at
150– 51.
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case of the DRC, China faces additional criticism because a number of
small, private Chinese companies, which are the most significant mine
operators in Katanga region, have a track record for poor environmental
practices.374  Although these companies are unrelated to the Sicomines
agreement, they tend to give all Chinese mining companies a bad name.
The DRC created the Environmental Study Group to collect environ-
mental data, coordinate all activities related to environmental and social
assessments, ensure compliance with environmental standards, promote
the environmental assessment capacity of the government, and prepare an
annual environmental report.375  As of 2011, the organization had only
seventeen employees and had to outsource the review of environmental
assessments to multidisciplinary panels.376  The DRC’s environmental reg-
ulatory capacity is especially weak, which underscores the need for Chi-
nese companies and those from other countries to act responsibly.377
D. Oil and Iron Ore Investments in Gabon
In 2002, Gabon designated a quarter of its territory as a nature reserve
to protect mainly pristine rainforest that hosts a variety of flora and
fauna.378  Environmental concerns over Chinese practices first arose when
SINOPEC began prospecting for oil in the Loango National Park.379  A
U.S.-based environmental non-governmental organization, Wildlife Con-
servation Society, and a local environmental group accused SINOPEC of
dynamiting and polluting the National Park and destroying the forest with
the construction of new roads.380  In 2006, the government of Gabon
ordered SINOPEC to halt its exploration activities.381  SINOPEC subse-
quently had the Dutch company that did the original environmental assess-
ment partner with a Gabonese organization and the World Wildlife Fund
to do a new assessment, which one study says was of high quality.382
SINOPEC then resumed its exploration for oil.383
The problem with SINOPEC occurred at the same time that the China
National Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Corporation
374. See Samentha Goethals et al., Chinese Mining Operations in Katanga: Democratic
Republic of the Congo, RTS. & ACCOUNTABILITY IN DEV. 5, 6 (Sept. 2009), www.raid-uk
.org/sites/default/files/drc-china-summary.pdf.
375. See Putzel & Kabuyaya, supra note 360, at 9.
376. Id.
377. Kabemba, supra note 372, at 151, 152.
378. Rasmus Reinvang & Jo Egil Tobiassen, Investing in Global Warming: A Survey of
Energy and Environment-related Investments in China by the World’s Second Largest Sover-
eign Wealth Fund in 2008, with Recommendations, WWF NORWAY 20 (2009); Ian Taylor,
China’s environmental footprint in Africa, CHINADIALOGUE (Feb. 2, 2007), https://www.
chinadialogue.net/article/741-China-s-environmental-footprint-in-Africa.
379. Reinvang & Tobiassen, supra note 378, at 20; Taylor supra note 378.
380. Taylor, supra note 378.
381. Johanna Jansson, Christopher Burke & Wenran Jiang, Chinese Companies in the
Extractive Industries of Gabon & the DRC: Perceptions of Transparency, CTR. FOR CHINESE
STUD., STELLENBOSCH U. 16 (2009).
382. Id.
383. Id.  See Taylor, supra note 378.
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(CMEC) and Sinosteel Corporation were at an early stage of developing a
multi-billion dollar iron ore concession in the Be´linga Mountains.384
China’s Export-Import Bank was to provide the financing for developing
the mine and infrastructure.385  The joint venture company known as
Comibel would then repay the loan through its mining revenues over
twenty-five years.386  The project included construction of the Ivindo Dam
to provide power, a 560 kilometer railway line linking Be´linga to the coast,
and a deep water harbor north of Libreville, the capital.387  Negotiations
over the terms of the project were privately held in the office of Gabon’s
president.388  The World Bank and several non-governmental organizations
objected to the secretive nature of the discussions and also to the fact that
the Ivindo Dam would have negative impacts on the Ivindo National
Park.389
In 2008, Marc Ona Essangui, the president of Brainforest, an environ-
mental nongovernmental organization in Gabon, sent a letter to the presi-
dent of China’s Export-Import Bank complaining that the infrastructure
work being done by CMEC in the Ivindo National Park had caused massive
deforestation and threatened the Kongou falls on the Ivindo River.390
Brainforest said that the project might also cause heavy pollution, resulting
in harm to the local fishing industry.391  The letter pointed out that
Gabonese law requires CMEC to conduct a local information campaign to
explain the impact of the project on the local people, something it had not
done.392  In addition to sending the letter, Essangui allegedly attempted to
incite a rebellion and thus was briefly arrested in Gabon.393  Thereafter, in
2009, he received the Goldman Environmental Prize for Africa.394
In 2011, Comibel lost the rights to Be´linga’s iron ore deposits because
development of the project had fallen behind schedule.395  In 2013, the
government of Gabon reached an agreement with Comibel to take back the
384. Chris Alden & Christopher R. Hughes, Harmony and Discord in China’s Africa
Strategy: Some Applications for Foreign Policy, 199 CHINA Q. 563, 571 (2009).
385. Id.
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PAMBAZUKA NEWS (July 8, 2010), http://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/chinese-
investments-gabon%E2%80%99s-extractive-industries.
387. See Belinga Dam, Gabon, INT’L RIVERS, https://www.internationalrivers.org/
resources/belinga-dam-gabon-3597 (last visited Feb. 7, 2016).
388. See generally id.
389. Id.  See generally ROMAIN DITTGEN, TO BE´LINGA OR NOT TO BE´LINGA? CHINA’S
EVOLVING ENGAGEMENT IN GABON’S MINING SECTOR (Nov. 2011); Alden & Hughes, supra
note 384, at 571– 72.
390. Letter from Marc Ona Essangui, Pres. of Brainforest, to Li Ruohu, Pres. of China
Export-Import Bank (Oct. 20, 2008) (on file with Int’l Rivers).
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iron-ore deposits and reopen bidding for exploiting the ore.396  Gabon also
revised the mining code to take into account these earlier problems.397
Nevertheless, the proposed open pit iron-ore mine continues to attract
opposition from local residents and environmental groups on the grounds
that it is located in an area of high biodiversity near Ivindo National
Park.398  While Gabon expects to open the auction process for exploitation
of the iron ore in 2016, it is not clear if Chinese companies will join the
bidding.399
E. Timber Trade and Investment in Mozambique
China is the largest importer of Mozambique’s hardwood timber,
receiving about ninety percent of exports in recent years.400  An estimated
eighty percent of all logging in Mozambique is illegal.401  A huge percent of
the timber exported to China, therefore, has been harvested illegally.402
Some species of tree require more than two hundred years to reach matur-
ity and are highly prized by manufacturers in China, and also as finished
goods by consumers around the world.403  Consequently, proper manage-
ment of these forests and ensuring their sustainability is a critical issue.
Chinese timber engagement in Mozambique traditionally constituted trade
rather than FDI.404  In fact, this became one of the complaints heard
locally.405  Chinese companies emphasized quick returns by purchasing
indigenous timber rather than investing in processing facilities and sus-
tainable forest management.406  One study concluded that Chinese opera-
tors have no interest in the sustainable development of the forestry
sector.407  Instead, Chinese operators are interested in making profits, and
when all of the easy money dries up they go elsewhere.408
There are no Chinese investors in Mozambique’s more permanent for-
estry plantations.409  Chinese nationals preferred to purchase timber
396. Id.
397. See id.
398. Id.
399. See id.
400. ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY, FIRST CLASS CRISIS: CHINA’S CRIMINAL AND
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402. Id. at 2; CHINA AND MOZAMBIQUE: FROM COMRADES TO CAPITALISTS 12– 14 (Chris
Alden & Se´rgio Chichava eds., 2014).
403. Laura A. German & Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff, Sino-Mozambican Relations and
Their Implications for Forests 37 (Ctr. for Int’l Forestry Research, Working Paper No. 93,
2012).
404. Id. at 21– 24.
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through a licensed Mozambican rather than work as a Chinese operator.410
If there were illegal activity or some other problem, the Chinese trader was
then one step removed from the operations.  In the mid-2000s, however,
Chinese entrepreneurs began to acquire their own concessions in order to
ensure access to timber supply.411  For example, Mozambique First Inter-
national Development (MOFID) is a Chinese company that developed a
timber concession in the Cabo Delgado province.412
The most common illegal activities in the timber trade include harvest-
ing in excess of licensed amounts, harvesting without a license, and har-
vesting in an area other than the licensed area.413  There is also the illegal
transit and purchase of timber and the illegal export of unprocessed
logs.414  There is evidence of discrepancies between the maximum allowa-
ble amount of timber to be cut, official records, and Chinese imports.415
In 2009, Chinese-owned Kings Way “was caught attempting to smuggle
illegal timber into China and subsequently fined.”416  In 2013, Kings Way
was again caught smuggling illegal timber and lost its operating license for
a year.417  During the same year, MOFID also had its license suspended for
one year for attempting to smuggle illegal timber to China.418  In 2015,
Mozambique opened an investigation of illegal timber exports to China,
stating that it had identified seventy containers of wood known as chanate
shipped from the port of Beira without authorization.419
In 2011, the director of Mozambique’s Forest Authority met with
senior officials of the Chinese State Forestry Administration.  This meeting
had the purpose of agreeing on a memorandum of understanding on joint
objectives for sustainable forest management.420  Key themes included law
enforcement, technical and financial capacity building of Chinese compa-
nies owning forest concessions in Mozambique, and the development and
sharing of databases on logging and the timber trade.421  While this was a
step in the right direction, it is not clear whether the two parties have
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Sievers et al. eds., 2010).
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08/illicit-wood-exports-to-china-prompt-mozambique-investigation.
420. FIRST CLASS CRISIS, supra note 400, at 8.
421. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-1\CIN102.txt unknown Seq: 41 19-MAY-16 16:52
2016 The Environmental Impact of China’s Investment in Africa 65
signed the memorandum.422  In 2013, officials from Mozambique and
China organized a workshop for Chinese companies operating in the coun-
try.423  They discussed the Chinese State Forestry Administration’s volun-
tary guidelines for companies operating overseas.424  One month after the
workshop, several of the companies in attendance were caught illegally
exporting logs.425  Mozambique imposed penalties on the offending com-
panies, but China took no action.426
Forest sector policies in Mozambique are subverted by China’s poli-
cies, the business practices of Chinese companies, the personal interests of
Mozambican elites, and the petty corruption of local government offi-
cials.427  Mozambican leaders are also reluctant to press China and its
companies too forcefully because of fear of jeopardizing significant Chi-
nese investment in the country.428  Daniel Ribeiro, a founder of an environ-
mental non-governmental organization in Mozambique, concluded, “At the
end of the day we Mozambicans must take the lion’s share of the blame for
this environmental tragedy.  Mozambique set the corrupt rules of this game
and Mozambique invited the corrupt players.  China is just good at exploit-
ing our rules of injustice, corruption and abuse.”429
Conclusion
Western and many of Africa’s independent media and environmental
organizations have a generally negative perception of the environmental
impacts of Chinese investments in Africa.430  Although there are excep-
tions, the government-controlled press and African officials tend to eschew
criticism of Chinese companies.431  Even though the perception of Chinese
performance is more negative than the reality of the situation, there is
plenty of room for legitimate criticism.  The issue is that generally critical
accounts get more attention than positive ones, and negative stories are
more likely to be recycled year after year.432  Regardless of the improve-
ments in the operations of Chinese companies, the changes are slow to be
covered by the press and environmental groups.433
To a considerable extent, Chinese environmental policy, lending insti-
tutions, and companies investing in Africa are playing catch-up.  In 2004,
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China’s Export-Import Bank adopted voluntary environmental guidelines,
which became public in 2007.434  The guidelines state that projects that
are harmful to the environment or do not obtain environmental approval
will not be funded.  If there are unacceptable environmental impacts dur-
ing project implementation, the Export-Import Bank requires immediate
remedial action or it will discontinue financial support.435  World Bank
president Paul Wolfowitz, however, pointed out in 2006 that eighty percent
of the world’s commercial banks in their financing arrangements respected
the Equator Principles, a framework for managing environmental and
social risks.436  The large Chinese banks did not apply them.437
Wolfowitz acknowledged that Chinese banks are relatively new to financ-
ing investment in Africa.  He urged them not to make the same mistakes
that, for example, France and the United States made earlier in Zaire.438
Ian Taylor, who has written extensively on China-Africa relations,
commented in 2007 that numerous examples exist where Chinese compa-
nies have been caught flouting environmental laws and collaborating with
criminals in the exploitation of Africa’s natural resources.  He noted that
while Western companies do the same, “the lack of a powerful environmen-
tal lobby within China that can effectively critique Beijing’s actions in
Africa is a real worry.”439  Peter Bosshard of International Rivers wrote in
2008 that China has started the process of establishing environmental
guidelines for overseas investments.  He emphasized that the guidelines
need to become more comprehensive and binding.  He concluded that
“strengthening China Exim Bank’s environmental policies will help miti-
gate the environmental impacts of Chinese investments in Africa.”440
In more recent years, the government of China has become more sensi-
tive to criticism of overseas investment by Chinese companies.  It has made
a concerted effort to improve environmental guidelines and encourage
their implementation.  It also encourages Chinese companies to apply Chi-
nese laws and standards in their overseas operations.441  Generally large
state-owned companies have been more receptive than medium and small
companies, especially those in the private sector.442  Until now, Chinese
companies operating overseas are only subject to voluntary guidelines.443
Unless China makes these guidelines mandatory and attaches penalties to
infractions, the guidelines will not likely change the behavior of many com-
panies.  Denise Leung, a former official in China’s Ministry of Environ-
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mental Protection and now with the World Resources Institute, argued for
mandatory principles while with the Ministry, but believes even voluntary
guidelines will have a positive impact on large companies interested in
their public image.444
It is important to acknowledge the difficulty of enforcing environmen-
tal guidelines on Chinese companies operating in Africa, especially when
the press in China and many African countries is carefully controlled by
the government, and environmental advocacy organizations tend to be
weak.  One area where Chinese companies have consistently performed
poorly (although some are improving) regards the relative lack of trans-
parency in the handling of sensitive environmental issues.  The enforce-
ment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 has allowed the United
States to have considerable success in stemming bribery overseas.445  Per-
haps China could apply similar legislation to environmental standards.
Many African countries are worse off than China as they attach low
priority to environmental protection, have understaffed environmental
bureaucracies, and even worse records for countering corruption.446  In an
attempt not to jeopardize Chinese investment or good relations with the
government of China, numerous African officials are reluctant to call out
Chinese companies that engage in unacceptable environmental prac-
tices.447  This situation does not provide an incentive for companies that
are focused on making a quick profit to engage in responsible but more
expensive environmental practices, especially where there are many Afri-
can officials and business persons who are prepared to accept the lower
standards.  It will often be up to the Chinese company to take the initiative.
It is in the interest of both China and the African countries to pursue
sound environmental practices and sustainable development.  Africa’s
development partners, including the United States, could also improve the
environmental situation by building the human capacity in African coun-
tries to monitor and regulate the environment.
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